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I. INTRODUCTION
Children eligible under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA")' are entitled to what every child wishes for in school: "instruction
specially designed to meet the unique needs of the ... child, supported by such
services as are necessary to permit the child 'to benefit' from the instruction."2
Certainly more could be wished for, as the entitlement to this "free appropriate
public education" ("FAPE")3 does not require maximizing the child's potential.'
* Associate Professor, Loyola University of New Orleans School of Law. The
author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Mark Weber of Depaul University
School of Law, Michele Mitchell, and Dr. Leland Johnston, M.D., for their invaluable
insights and comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491o (2000).
2. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982) (defining the term "free
appropriate public education" under IDEA).
3. The statutory definition of the FAPE that must be provided eligible children is:
special education and related services that-
1
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The Sixth Circuit explained what school districts must provide to eligible
children in popular terms: "[IDEA] requires that the Tullahoma schools provide
the educational equivalent of a serviceable Chevrolet ... [and not] a Cadillac
.... " But this Chevy must "confer some educational benefit,"' which many
find to be meaningful,7 and is significantly more than what general education
children are entitled to.'
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 1414(d) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2000); see infra notes 214-38 and accompanying text (defining
special education and related services).
4. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198, 199, 204 n.26; see also Laura Ketterman, Comment,
Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Exclude Gifted and Talented
Children with Emotional Disabilities? An Analysis ofJ.D. v. Pawlet, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J.
913,927,931 (2001) (IDEA provides a minimum level of education and does not require
that eligible children reach their potential).
5. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 1993).
6. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.
7. See, e.g., Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16,853 F.2d 171,180-83
(3d Cir. 1988) (IDEA requires "meaningful" educational benefit and not merely de
minimis or trivial benefit); Hall ex rel. Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629,
636 (4th Cir. 1985); see also John E.B. Myers & William R. Jenson, The Meaning of
"Appropriate" Educational Programming Under the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, 1984 S. ILL. U. L.J. 401,438-40; Sharon C. Streett, The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 35, 45 (1996). For
discussion of how the Rowley "some benefit" standard evolved into a "meaningful
benefit" standard, see Dixie Snow Huefner, Judicial Review of the Special Education
Program Requirements Under the Education forAll Handicapped Children Act: Where
Have We Been and Where Should We be Going?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 483,494-
500 (1991), Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped
Act: A Study in the Interpretation ofRadical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 352-
53, 380-81 (1990), and Tara L. Eyer, Comment, Greater Expectations: How the 1997
IDEA Amendments Raise the Basic Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities,
103 DICK. L. REV. 613, 623-25 (1998).
8. Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma ofDifference: Bilingual and
Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 180 (1985); Michael Dannenberg,
Note, A Derivative Right to Education: How Standards-Based Education Reform
Redefines the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 629,
632 (1997). For discussion of the current right to education for general education
students, see Jane K. Babin, Comment, Adequate Special Education: Do California
Schools Meet the Test?, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 215, 237-49 (2000), and Peter S.
Smith, Note and Comment, Addressing the Plight of Inner-City Schools: The Federal
[Vol. 69
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/3
2004] INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 443
While IDEA eligibility is sometimes opposed because of the resulting
stigma to children,9 for most children eligibility means the difference between
receiving essential "special education and related services" at public expense or
nothing at all.' Even children eligible for services under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504")" (a nondiscrimination statute that
works in tandem with IDEA and also requires the provision of a free appropriate
public education") often seek IDEA eligibility because it specifies services and
Right to Education After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 18 WHITrIERL. REV. 825
(1997).
9. Oberti ex rel. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1217 n.24 (3d Cir. 1993)
("stigma, mistrust and hostility... have traditionally been harbored against persons with
disabilities") (citing Minow, supra note 8, at 202-11); H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 149
(2003); Minow, supra note 8, at 181 ("identification as handicapped.., labels the child
as handicapped and may expose the child to attributions of inferiority for this labeling
with the attendant risks of stigma, isolation, and reduced self-esteem").
10. FAPE requires the provision of special education and related services. Supra
note 3. "The term 'special education' means specially designed instruction, at no cost
to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability .... ." 20 U.S.C. §
1401(25) (2000); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.26(a)(2)(i)-(iii) (2003). The critical term,
"specially designed instruction,"
means adapting... the content, methodology, or delivery of instruction-
(i) To address the unique needs of the child that result from the child's
disability; and
(ii) To ensure access of the child to the general curriculum, so that he or she
can meet the educational standards within thejurisdiction of the public agency
that apply to all children.
34 C.F.R. § 300.26(a)(3) (2003).
The term "related services" means transportation, and such developmental,
corrective, and other supportive services (including speech-language
pathology and audiology services, psychological services, physical and
occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation, social work
services, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation
and mobility services, and medical services, except that such medical services
shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to
assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes
the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (2000); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.24 (2003).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 104.4 (2003).
12. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2003); Minow, supra note 8, at 174 (explaining how IDEA
and Section 504 work together); Robert T. Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A
Senator's Perspective, 3 VT. L. REv. 71, 82 (1978) ("The two laws and their regulations
reinforce and reciprocate each other."). For a discussion of Section 504 protections, see
LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW 84-86 (1984), and Judith Welch
Wegner, Educational Rights of Handicapped Children: Three Federal Statutes and an
Evolving Jurisprudence, Part I: The Statutory Maze, 17 J.L. & EDUC. 387, 395-404
(1988). See also supra note 11 and accompanying text; infra notes 13, 215-21, 235-37
3
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rights not enumerated in Section 504.13 Because IDEA eligibility results in
educational benefit, services, and unfortunately, a potentially damaging stigma,
an eligibility determination "is one of the most important, if not the most
important, decision that will ever be made in that person's life."' 4
IDEA eligibility decisions are equally important to parents of disabled
students for the same reasons. In addition, their child's eligibility entitles them
to "meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child's education and the
right to seek review of any decisions they think inappropriate."' 5  They
participate in the creation of their child's Individualized Educational Program
and accompanying text (discussing the interplay between Section 504 and IDEA).
13. See, e.g., Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369, 1372 (8th Cir. 1996)
(child eligible under Section 504 sought IDEA eligibility because only IDEA required the
school to provide transition services such as instruction in driver's education, self-
advocacy, and independent living skills); In re Laura H., 509 EHLR 242 (Mass. SEA
1988) (child sought IDEA eligibility because she desired closed circuit television for
chemistry lab rather than mere provision of alternative biology class that was provided
as a Section 504 accommodation); see also Wegner, supra note 12, at 410 (IDEA
"provides more guidance concerning the types of services available and the methodology
for service selection than is the case under section 504's implied accommodations
requirement. The EAHCA also creates detailed procedural rights not found in Section
504. .. ."). For a detailed discussion of the differences between services provided under
IDEA and Section 504, see generally Thomas F. Guernsey, The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1983, and Section 504 ofthe Rehabilitation Act
of 1973: Statutory Interaction Following the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of
1986, 68 NEB. L. REv. 564 (1989).
14. This statement was penned by Senator Stafford, a co-sponsor of the original
IDEA. Stafford, supra note 12, at 79.
15. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,311-12 (1988); see also Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of
Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985) (stating that parents help develop eligible child's
educational program and assess its effectiveness); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
207 (1982) (finding that parents and educators are primarily responsible for formulating
the educational goals and methods for eligible children); Babin, supra note 8, at 222
(noting high level of parental involvement); Judith DeBerry, Comment, When Parents
and Educators Clash: Are Special Education Students Entitled to a Cadillac
Education?, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 503, 506 (2003) (stating that parents are involved in all
decisions that affect their eligible child's education); Tara J. Parillo, Comment, The
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Parental Involvement and the
Surrogate Appointment Process, 74 OR. L. REv 1339, 1339 (1995) (stating that parents
are equal partners in educational process); Tamara J. Weinstein, Note, Equal Educational
Opportunities for Learning Deficient Students, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 500, 506 (2000)
(finding that parents have a central role in the education of their eligible children).
Further, "[e]mpowering parents to be more involved in the decisions about the education
of their child is the focus of many changes" in the reauthorized IDEA, currently pending
in Congress. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 155 (2003).
[Vol. 69
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("IEP"),'6 which means they help in planning their child's educational goals, the
special education and related services their child will receive and how they will
be evaluated. 7 While the parents' actual impact on the final IEP and on their
child's educational programming may be questioned,'" they at least have a
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.344(a)(1), 300.345
(2003); see also Honig, 484 U.S. at 311 ("Congress repeatedly emphasized throughout
the Act the importance and indeed the necessity of parental participation in both the
development of the IEP and any subsequent assessments of its effectiveness."); Rowley,
458 U.S. at 208 ("Congress sought to protect individual children by providing for
parental involvement . . . in the formulation of the child's individual educational
program."); William H. Clune & Mark H. Van Pelt, A Political Method of Evaluating the
Education forAll Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and Several Gaps of Gap Analysis,
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 13 (1985) (the IEP process "provide[s] parent
involvement and protection"); Huefner, supra note 7, at 486. For a detailed discussion
of the procedures for creating an IEP and its required contents, see Eyer, supra note 7,
at 631-32 (explaining changes made to IEP procedures and contents in 1997 amendments
to IDEA); Ketterman, supra note 4, at 927-28; Luretha R. McClendon, Note, The
Representation of Children with Disabilities in Connecticut Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 5 QuINNIPIAc HEALTH L.J. 85, 106-11 (2001) (the IEP is the
method of shaping the free appropriate public education to suit the individual needs of
the eligible child); Bruce G. Sheffler, Note, Education of Handicapped Children: The
IEP Process and the Search for an Appropriate Education, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 81
(1981); and Weinstein, supra note 15, at 505-06.
17. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2000) (defining IEP); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347 (2003) (same);
Lucy W. Shum, Educationally Related Mental Health Servicesfor Children with Serious
Emotional Disturbance: Addressing Barriers to Access Through IDEA, 5 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL'Y 233, 238 (2002); McClendon, supra note 16, at 106; see also Honig,
484 U.S. at 311 (the IEP is the centerpiece of IDEA's educational delivery system);
Burlington v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985) ("The modus operandi of
the Act is the [IEP]."); Kevin D. Hill, Legal Conflicts in Special Education: How
Competing Paradigms in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act Create
Litigation, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 129, 142 (1986) (the IEP "is the heart of special education
under [IDEA]"); Parillo, supra note 15, at 1339 ("The key vehicle for providing children
with an appropriate education is the individualized educational plan (IEP) .... ");
Stafford, supra note 12, at 75 (the IEP is the "base-line mechanism" within IDEA);
Robert Caperton Hannon, Note, Returning to the True Goal of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: Self-Sufficiency, 50 VAND. L. REV. 715, 723 (1997).
18. See Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 16, at 35 (IDEA "increased parental
participation somewhat, but probably not nearly to the extent that Congress originally
contemplated"); Theresa Glennon, Disabling Ambiguities: Confronting Barriers to the
Education of Students with Emotional Disabilities, 60 TENN L. REV. 295, 352 (1993)
(parents have little effect on the outcome of IEP meetings); Rebecca Weber Goldman,
A Free Appropriate Public Education in the Least Restrictive Environment: Promises
Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 243, 279 (1994) ("active participation by parents does not generally
occur" and parents "simply defer to the recommendations of the school district"); Hill,
5
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comprehensive relationship with the people involved in their child's education
unlike the parents of non-eligible children. 9 If the parents don't like the IEP,
their child's progress under the IEP, or believe any other of their significant
"procedural safeguards"" are violated, they may initiate an impartial due process
hearing and then an action in state or federal court.2 In short, IDEA compels
schools to seek parental input regarding the child's educational programming
and holds schools responsible if that educational programming does not benefit
the child-rights that parents of general education students only dream about.
22
supra note 17, at 143 ("the goal of equal participation by parents has not been met"); id.
at 147 ("the goal of parent-educator partnerships has not been met"); Babin, supra note
8, at 222-23 ("Parents, although envisioned as partners in a non-adversarial process, are
frequently intimidated by the educational bureaucracy into acquiescence with school
district recommendations . . ... "); Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate"
Education: The EducationforAll Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV.
1103, 1111-12 (1979) (parental impact at IEP meetings on educational decisions is low).
19. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Supervisory Standard of Care for Students with
Disabilities, 80 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 779, 779 (1993); Weinstein, supra note 15, at 506.
20. Parents of IDEA eligible children are entitled to significant procedural
safeguards to ensure their children receive FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2000); 34 C.F.R.
§§ 300.500-.517 (2003). Among other things, they are entitled to: written prior notice
when the school proposes to change the identification, evaluation or placement of their
child, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2000); "obtain an independent educational evaluation of
the child," id. § 1415(b)(1); "examine all records relating to [their] child," id. §
1415(b)(1); refuse consent to any evaluation or placement of their child, 34 C.F.R. §
300.505(a) (2003); progress reports from school districts informing them of their child's
progress towards annual goals in the IEP, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(viii)(II)(aa) (2000);
and to participate in the identification and evaluation of their child for a disability, id.
§ 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.501(a)(2)(1) (2003). For detailed summaries of IDEA's
procedural safeguards, see LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 237-55 (2d
ed. 1995) (discussing procedural requirements applicable to each stage of special
education process from initial referral through delivery of services); Philip Daniel &
Karen Bond Coriell, Traversing the Sisyphean Trails of the Education for All
Handicapped Children's Act: An Overview, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 571, 593-97 (1992);
Goldman, supra note 18, at 280-82; Huefner, supra note 7, at 485-86; DeBerry, supra
note 15, at 512, 521-23; and Eyer, supra note 7, at 618-19.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(5)-(8), (e)-(g) (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506-.512 (2003).
22. Elena Gallegos, Thirty Years of Special Education Law: The Long and
Winding Road, 10 SPECIAL EDUC. L. UPDATE 1 (Feb. 2002) (calling IDEA's protections
"massive"); Minow, supra note 8, at 179-80 ("[Tjhe procedural dimensions of the special
education programs constitute a major reallocation of power to parents in the assignment
of educational resources and placements."). But see Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 16,
at 35-38 (arguing that due process rights under IDEA do not protect parents and
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Educators share the same high stakes as children and parents in IDEA
eligibility determinations, as they must provide the parents with procedural
safeguards, create and implement the IEP and pay for the special education and
related services that comprise the child's free appropriate public education.23
This is no small matter, as over seventy-eight billion dollars is spent annually on
the roughly six million children receiving special education and related
services.24 Eligibility rules impact not only how much educators spend, but also
how much money states and school districts receive. IDEA is a funding statute
under which the federal government covers a portion of the state's costs to
educate eligible children.2" In exchange for the funds, states must agree to
provide, among other things, the entitlements discussed above.26 The amount of
funding a state (and usually district and school) receives hinges on the number
of IDEA eligible children it serves.27 Because states receive no federal monies
for children eligible solely under Section 504, there is arguably a strong incentive
to over-identify children as IDEA eligible.2" Irrespective of the incentives
23. Eligibility standards are also vital to educators as they make eligibility decisions
on a daily basis to fulfill their obligation to find, classify and serve disabled students
within their jurisdiction. This is known as the "child find" obligation. 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(3)(A) (2000) (identifying the state child find obligations); id. § 1414(a)(l)(A)
(identifying the local education association's child find obligations); 34 C.F.R. §§
300.125(a)(1), 300.451 (2003). For an in-depth discussion of IDEA's child find
provisions, see Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 16, at 21-25, Shum, supra note 17, at 251-
52, and Streett, supra note 7, at 36-37.
24. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, A NEW
ERA: REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 3, 30
(2002), available at http://www.ed.gov/inits/commissionsboards/whspecialeducation/
(2000-2001 figures) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION]. This accounts for 21.4
percent of all education spending. Id. The federal government grants for special
education in 2003 reached nearly nine billion dollars. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 145
(2003).
25. 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(a)(2) (2000). The maximum state grant is determined by
multiplying the number of eligible children served by the state times forty percent of the
national average per pupil expenditure. For an explanation of the funding formula, see
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 31, Ellen A. Callegary, The IDEA 's Promise
Unfulfilled: A Second Look at Special Education & Related Services for Children with
Mental Health Needs after Garret F., 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 164, 200-01 (2002),
and Theresa M. Willard, Note, Economics and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act: The Influence of Funding Formulas on the Identification and Placement
of Disabled Students, 31 IND. L. REV. 1167, 1179-81 (1998).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2000) (delineating requirements for states to receive
funding).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (a)(2) (2000). Most states also divvy up IDEA monies among
school districts based on how many IDEA eligible children they are serving. Willard,
supra note 25, at 1179-81.
28. H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 89 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 86
7
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created by the funding scheme, the impact of eligibility criteria on educators'
budgets is undeniable.
IDEA eligibility criteria even affect general education students. IDEA is
intended to underwrite only a portion of the full cost of educating eligible
children.29 Further, the federal government woefully underfunds IDEA,
historically covering much less of the costs than promised.3" As a result, schools
"are devoting a growing share of finite resources to disabled children to the
exclusion of non-disabled children."
31
Considering the importance of eligibility criteria to disabled students,
parents, educators and even regular education students, one would presume that
the criteria are clearly delineated and uniformly understood. Yet they are
intricately tangled and often misapplied by courts, hearing officers and inevitably
parents and educators. Definitive and precise rules may not be possible due to
the individualized nature of classifying a child as disabled. 32 But IDEA's
eligibility criteria, the most complex criteria in IDEA, only add additional layers
(Many problems of over-identification result from IDEA's current child-count based
funding system that "reduces the proactive scrutiny that such referrals would receive if
they did not have the additional monetary benefit."); MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE § 2.2(1) (1992); Marc S. Krass, The Right
to Public Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976
S. ILLU. L.F. 1016, 1066 (the funding formula creates incentives to serve more children);
Minow, supra note 8, at 181 ("the labeling process is designed to secure funding");
Willard, supra note 25, at 1185 (there is a "financial incentive for labeling children
disabled"). But see H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 143 (2003) ("The Committee does not
believe that individual educators identify children in order to maximize the level of funds
that flow to the school, district, or State.").
29. See supra note 25; see also H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 377 (2003) (Congress
intended to pay for only a portion of the excess costs of educating eligible children);
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 20, at 86 ("The EACHA was not intended to provide all the
funding needed for education of children with disabilities but was intended to relieve
some of the burden of the high cost of educating handicapped children.").
30. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 93 (2003) ("Historically, the appropriations for the
Act have not come close to reaching the 40 percent level. In the years prior to 1995,
funding for the Part B program reached roughly 7 percent of the average per pupil
expenditure."); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 29; Goldman, supra note 18,
at 244 n. 11. The federal government is currently paying only eighteen percent of the
national per pupil expenditure. Anne L. Bryant, Making IDEA Right: NSBA's Top
Priority, SCHOOL BOARD NEWS, May 20, 2003.
31. Dannenberg, supra note 8, at 632; see also John S. Harrison, Comment, Self-
Sufficiency Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act: A Suggested
JudicialApproach, 1981 DuKE L.J. 516,540 ("the expensive education that handicapped
children require does sacrifice to some extent the education available to normal
children").
32. Krass, supra note 28, at 1017.
[Vol. 69
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of density to an already thick medical and psychiatric topic. 3 Aggravating this
intricacy is the incomplete and often confused eligibility analysis emitted by
courts and hearing officers. These decision-makers delve deep into what
constitutes a "free appropriate public education" for children eligible under
IDEA while often tersely evaluating eligibility in the first instance.34 The
eligibility knot is further tightened by the lack of scholarship in the area, as the
scholars, like the courts, focus on what must be provided to IDEA eligible
children rather than on who is eligible.3" This is maddening for children, parents,
and educators alike, as programming issues do not even arise until the eligibility
question is resolved, and only then when the child is found eligible.36
33. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 21 (finding the eligibility
requirements among the most "complex" requirements in IDEA); WEBER, supra note 28,
§ 2.2(1) ("The definition of children covered under IDEA is doubly circular."); Jeffrey
F. Champagne, Special Education Law-Sometimes It's Simple: An Examination of
Honig v. Doe, Timothy W. v. Rochester, New Hampshire, School District, Dellmuth v.
Muth, and Moore v. District of Columbia, 59 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 587, 588 (1990)
(eligibility standards are circular); Minow, supra note 8, at 179-80 ("[T]he statute is
unclear about which children shall be included within the reach of its guarantees ....
The substantive dimensions of the program remain ambiguous, however, especially
regarding what kind of special needs should entitle the child to special placements or
services.").
34. See infra Parts II, III (discussing incorrect eligibility analysis by courts and
hearing officers); see also DeBerry, supra note 15, at 505 (the overriding litigation issue
usually involves the provision of FAPE).
35. A Westlaw search revealed 780 law journal articles mentioning "free
appropriate public education." See, e.g., Daniel & Coriell, supra note 20, at 578-93
(discussing the level of services required under IDEA); Goldman, supra note 18, at 255-
60; Huefner, supra note 7; Streett, supra note 7, at 45-46; Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Board
of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley: Utter Chaos,
12 J.L. & EDUC. 235 (1983) (discussing impropriety of Rowley, the Supreme Court
decision regarding FAPE); Babin, supra note 8, at 225-30; Miriam M. Laver, Recent
Decision, Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.
1998), 62 TEMP. L. REV. 429(1989); McClendon, supra note 16, at 102-06; see also infra
note 154 (identifying commentary on Rowley). In contrast, eligibility standards are
typically only summarized or criticized in passing in the literature. See, e.g., Callegary,
supra note 25, at 186-88 (discussing the "adversely affects" eligibility requirement);
Streett, supra note 7, at 43-44 (mentioning eligibility requirements); Ketterman, supra
note 4, at 934-36 (same); McClendon, supra note 16, at 91 -101 (summarizing eligibility
standards).
36. It is particularly problematic to schools, as the substantive ambiguity of IDEA
eligibility standards combined with "the procedural mechanisms may empower parents
to demand an evaluation of the child, and to pursue educational services responsive to
his or her needs even where the child in previous times would not have been considered
handicapped." Minow, supra note 8, at 180.
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The confusion surrounding eligibility standards leads to the disasterous
results of both over-identification37 and under-identification of IDEA eligible
children.3" Indeed, one of Congress's primary concerns in reauthorizing IDEA,
a process currently underway, is the over-identification of IDEA eligible
students, particularly minority students.39 Such misplacement stigmatizes the
students, denies them an opportunity for a high quality education, limits their
opportunities for post-secondary education and employment, and takes valuable
resources away from truly disabled students." On the other hand, under-
identification, usually of emotionally disturbed children, leaves children with
significant emotional, social and behavioral needs unserved and often unable to
participate effectively in society.4
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(8)(B) (2000) ("More minority children continue to be
served in special education than would be expected from the percentage of minority
students in the general school population."); H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 89 (1997),
reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 86 ("Today, the growing problem is over identifying
children as disabled when they might not be truly disabled."); Eyer, supra note 7, at 627
("[O]ver-identification of children as disabled has become a significant problem in recent
years.").
38. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 8 (current identification methods
lead to failing to identify children); Callegary, supra note 25, at 179, 184 (the lack of
clear definitions leads to inconsistent application of eligibility standards and the
underserving of emotionally disturbed children); Glennon, supra note 18, at 296
(ambiguities in eligibility criteria result in failing to respond to social and emotional
needs of students); Shum, supra note 17, at 244 (the inconsistent application of eligibility
standards operates to exclude disabled children).
39. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 143 (2003) ("The Committee is concerned that there
continues to be a problem with the overidentification of children, particularly minority
children, as having disabilities."); id. at 137 (purpose of the reauthorized IDEA is
"reducing the overidentification or misidentification of nondisabled children, including
minority youth"); id. at 142 (the bill adds provisions "[t]o address the over- and under-
inclusion of students in special education"); id. at 149-50.
40. Id. at 137-38, 149 (identifying the "significant adverse consequences" resulting
from misidentification, including stigma that seriously affects the child's self-perception,
separation from the core curriculum, and limited access to post-secondary education and
employment opportunities).
41. Prior to the enactment of IDEA, "the most poorly served of disabled students
were emotionally disturbed children." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988). These
children "remain the most underserved population of students with disabilities." H.R.
REP. No. 101-544, at 39 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1761; see also
Glennon, supra note 18, at 303 (most emotionally disturbed children are not served at
all); Hannon, supra note 17, at 723 (only nineteen percent of emotionally disturbed
children are served). For a discussion of the significant effects of under-identification
of emotionally disabled students, see Callegary, supra note 25, at 179, and Shum, supra
note 17, at 154-55.
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This Article attempts to untangle the web of IDEA eligibility standards in
order to determine who is entitled to its extensive benefits. The overriding
question addressed is whether children passing from grade to grade may still be
IDEA eligible. When the Supreme Court stated famously in Board ofEducation
of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley that not every child
passing from grade to grade is receiving a free appropriate public education
under IDEA, it necessarily recognized a class of children who were IDEA
eligible despite passing marks.42 Identifying the characteristics of these children
is the destination of this Article. But the journey crystallizes the scope of IDEA
by identifying which disabling problems IDEA seeks to capture and address, and
how severe the problem must be to concern IDEA. The journey also provides
courts, hearing officers, educators and parents a clear roadmap to IDEA's
eligibility criteria and the tools to make correct eligibility decisions.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the purposes of IDEA and sets forth
its eligibility criteria and procedures. In broad summary, IDEA requires that in
order for a child to be eligible the child must have an enumerated disability that
adversely affects the child's educational performance and by reason thereof the
child needs special education. Part III analyzes the meaning of the second
eligibility requirement--"adversely affects educational performance." The
Article proposes that the term "educational performance" include all areas of
performance required in the state curriculum and all areas of performance
tracked by the state's schools. Therefore, a disability that leads to poor behavior
adversely affects the child's educational performance, despite the child's good
grades, if the state curriculum requires instruction in behavior or the state schools
track behavior. Part IV discusses the "needs special education" requirement and
concludes that it is indeed a limit on IDEA eligibility separate from the
"adversely affects" element. The Article concludes that IDEA does not require
finding that a child needs special education merely because the child can benefit
from it. Rather, a need for special education should be found only when the
child is performing poorly or below average in any area of educational
performance. Therefore, children performing better than their peers do not need
special education and are not eligible even if their disability adversely affects
their educational performance.
II. BACKGROUND OF IDEA
Congress enacted IDEA's predecessor, the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act ("EAHCA"), in 1975."' The historical underpinnings of the
EAHCA are extensively discussed in the scholarship and are only briefly
42. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982).
43. Pub L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
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summarized here." Both Congress's fears and hopes in passing EAHCA are
important to understanding the eligibility criteria.
Congress's piimary trepidation in passing the EAHCA was trampling on the
primacy of state control of education.4 Congress was aware not only of "the
States' traditional role in the formulation and execution of educational policy""
but also that it is their most important function.47 Local control over education
has been historically justified on grounds of pedagogy, politics and ethics.4"
Local control is pedagogically justified because, as the Supreme Court has
noted, it is necessary for a quality education.49 The complex nature of education
44. See, e.g., Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189-204; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 20, at 84-89;
Susan Smith Blakely, Judicial and Legislative Attitudes Toward the Right to an Equal
Education for the Handicapped, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 603, 606-13 (1979); Callegary, supra
note 25, at 167-68; Goldman, supra note 18, at 246-50 (discussingjudicial and legislative
landmarks that led to the enactment of IDEA); Hill, supra note 17, at 130-36; Huefner,
supra note 7, at 484-85 (setting forth history of educating disabled prior to IDEA); Shum,
supra note 17, at 234-36 (history of IDEA); Weber, supra note 7, at 355-64; Babin, supra
note 8, at 216-24; LaDonna L. Boeckman, Note, Bestowing the Key to Public Education:
The Effects ofJudicial Determinations ofthe Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
on Disabled and Nondisabled Students, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 855, 857-65 (1998) (in-depth
discussion of the genesis of IDEA); DeBerry, supra note 15, at 508-11 (discussing the
legislative history of IDEA); Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of
Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 599, 603-18 (1995) (detailing the
legislative history of IDEA, the history of de jure exclusion of children with disabilities,
early legislation to aid disabled children, and constitutional theories regarding rights of
disabled children); Willard, supra note 25, at 1168.
45. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741
(1974) (holding that "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeplyrooted than
local control over the operation of schools"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 40, 58-59 (1973) (states and localities legitimately control education);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("public education in our Nation is
committed to the control of state and local authorities"); Babin, supra note 8, at 247
(stating that the duty of education "should be ... on individual states rather than the
federal government"); Harrison, supra note 31, at 528; Smith, supra note 8, at 843
("education has traditionally been the states' province under the Tenth Amendment").
46. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208 n.30; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 241 (1990) (schools have traditionally had "latitude to determine
appropriate subjects of instruction"); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863 (1982)
("The Court has long recognized that local school boards have broad discretion in the
management of school affairs.") (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
47. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinknan, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) (stating that local control over education "is a
vital national tradition").
48. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 289 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-72; Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,478
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alone mandates local autonomy over educational decisions."0 Federal usurpation
of education would destroy experimentation, innovation and competition for
educational excellence, the hallmarks of local control."s Indeed, no public
institution stands to gain more from multiple viewpoints and experimentation
with multiple methodologies than schools." Most importantly, though, local
control over education is necessary so that states, localities and schools can
formulate and apply their curricula to inculcate their students with local
community values.5 3
Local control over education is politically necessary because it offers
parents meaningful participation in educational policies affecting their children.54
Parents can approach responsive local school boards with their education issues
rather than a distant oversized bureaucracy far removed from local concerns.5"
Indeed, "[i]t is fair to say that no single agency of government at any level is
closer to the people whom it serves than the typical school board." 6
It is for these reasons-educational quality, instilling community values,
parental input and local accountability-that local control over education is
ethically necessary. Parents simply must be able to influence their children's
education "without surrendering control to distant politicians.""
Thus, in passing the EAHCA Congress sought to preserve the local nature
of education while furthering the national interest in the education of disabled
children. 8 This balance was accomplished by, among other things, deferring to
(1972) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. Krass, supra note 28, at 1047.
51. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973).
52. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50.
53. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982); see also Dowell, 498 U.S. at
248 (stating that local control allows school programs to fit local needs); Mergens, 496
U.S. at 289 n.26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that educational decisions should "be
made by educators familiar with the experience and needs of the particular children
affected and with the culture of the community in which they are likely to live as adults");
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-42 (noting that local autonomy over education is necessary to
ensure that community concerns are taught in the schools); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49-50
(same).
54. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49.
55. Pico, 457 U.S. at 891 (Burger, J., dissenting) (stating that school boards involve
"democracy in a microcosm" and are "truly 'of the people and by the people').
56. Id. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 289 n.26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923)); see also Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407
U.S. 451, 469 (1972) (society demands local and direct control over educational
decisions affecting one's child).
58. Babin, supra note 8, at 247 (Congress sought to not "supplant the authority of
states in providing.., education.").
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the states for the substantive and qualitative elements of education under IDEA. 9
For example, in defining the free appropriate public education to be provided
eligible children, Congress incorporated state educational standards.6 1 This
allows states to enhance the minimum federal "some educational benefit"
standard.6' In summary, Congress ensured that states and schools "remain
charged with defining educational standards for disabled children" when passing
the EAHCA.62
The EAHCA's intrusion into the traditionally exclusive realm of states and
localities was justified because disabled children were either being provided
inadequate education or entirely excluded from schools. 3 Congress's hope for
disabled students in passing IDEA was to achieve equality of access and self-
sufficiency.64 The first purpose was to assist states in carrying out their
constitutional obligation to provide disabled students with equal protection of the
59. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982) (IDEA did not "overturn a
State's choice of appropriate educational theories"); Babin, supra note 8, at 236.
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8)(B) (2000). For discussion of the incorporation of state
educational standards into the FAPE standard, see Dannenberg, supra note 8, at 635
("[R]eluctance to interfere in state education policy is precisely why checklist element
'(C)' incorporates state definitions of a minimally appropriate education into the IDEA's
'free appropriate public education' definition and guarantee. To do otherwise would
have the federal government either supersede a state's definition of an appropriate
education or require differential and lesser treatment of disabled children."); and Scott
F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law, 2003 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 561.
6 1. See, e.g., Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994) ("State
standards that impose a greater duty to educate handicapped children, if they are not
inconsistent with federal standards, are enforceable in federal court under IDEA.");
Burlington v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 788-89 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding state
standards enhancing minimal federal substantive "free appropriate public education"
definition enforceable under IDEA through required incorporation), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359
(1985).
62. Babin, supra note 8, at 236.
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2000); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note
24, at 11 (before enactment of IDEA, only one in five disabled children received public
education, one million children were excluded entirely and 3.5 million did not receive
appropriate services); Daniel & Coriell, supra note 20, at 571-72 (history of educating
disabled children is exclusion by courts and states); Minow, supra note 8, at 166-67
(history of educating disabled children "emphasized the exclusion ofexceptional children
from mainstream classrooms or from schooling altogether"); Weber, supra note 7, at 355-
56 (explaining the historical exclusion of disabled children from schools prior to the
enactment of IDEA); Babin, supra note 8, at 213-14.
64. Weber, supra note 7, at 362-63; Hannon, supra note 17, at 719-20; Ketterman,
supra note 4, at 917-18. For an in-depth discussion of the purposes and congressional
intent in passing IDEA, see Shum, supra note 17, at 236-37 (discussing the objectives
of IDEA); and Harrison, supra note 31, at 521-28 (discussing congressional intent).
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laws.6 Congress sought to accomplish this by bringing previously excluded
handicapped children into the public schools."" But Congress protected disabled
students' equal protection rights by providing only equality of access rather than
equality of opportunity.67 Put another way, the equal protection purpose of
IDEA is served by providing disabled students access to an adequate education
rather than providing disabled students access to an education equal to that being
given to non-disabled students. As the Supreme Court put it, IDEA opens the
door of public education, but does not "guarantee any particular level of
education once inside" except "some educational benefit.
68
The second fundamental goal was to assist disabled children in achieving
self-sufficiency.69 This is also the primary goal of education for non-disabled
students.7" Adopting the maxim that "[i]f you think education is expensive, try
ignorance,"" Congress justified its IDEA expenditures on the ground that the
65. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1982); see also Weber, supra note
7, at 411 ("Congress enacted that legislation pursuant to its duty to enforce the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.").
66. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 192, 200.
69. Id. at 201 n.23; see also Myers & Jenson, supra note 7, at 428 ("The raison
d'etre of the Act is assistance of handicapped children on their road to independence.");
Harrison, supra note 31, at 523 (The Act's "legislative history makes plain that Congress
also meant to further the national goal of self-sufficiency for handicapped Americans.").
For an in-depth discussion of the importance of self-sufficiency in IDEA, see Hannon,
supra note 17, and Harrison, supra note 31, at 521-26.
70. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,221 (1972); see also Krass, supra note 28,
at 1025 ("The objectives of public education in general are to prepare children to live
successfully in society, to meet the demands placed upon them as adults, and to be able
to contribute something to society and, thus, receive compensation to meet the needs of
personal sustenance and pleasure."); Babin, supra note 8, at 290 ("The purpose of
education is to prepare schoolchildren for the future to provide the skills and knowledge
necessary for life, work, and participation in society."); id. at 246 ("the primary
governmental purpose for providing education [is] to ensure a productive populace that
is fully capable of participating in society, thereby promising economic and social gains
for all members of that society"); Boeckman, supra note 44, at 858; Smith, supra note
8, at 855-56 ("the purpose of education is childrens' emotional and intellectual
development such that they can compete in the economy and function in political
society"). Educators also agree that self-sufficiency is the proper goal of education in
general, and of education for the disabled in particular. See IRVING R. DICKMAN,
INDEPENDENT LIVING: NEW GOAL FOR DISABLED PERSONS 9, 14-16 (1975); MARILENE
E. JACQUES, REHABILITATION COUNSELING: SCOPE AND SERVICES 4 (1970); FRIEDRICH
PAULSEN, A SYSTEM OF ETHICS 641 (Frank Thilly ed., 1903).
71. ROBERT BYRNE, THE 2,548 BEST THINGS ANYBODY EVER SAID 126 (1996).
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cost of supporting a dependent, disabled population for life was far greater than
the cost of educating that population to become independent."
Congress reiterated these dual goals of equality and self-sufficiency when
reauthorizing IDEA in 1997.73 Congress will likely re-emphasize these same
goals when it completes the reauthorization of IDEA currently underway.74 With
these fundamental purposes in mind, it is easy to presume that all children
medically certified as disabled are IDEA eligible. A quick reading of IDEA, its
regulations and its predecessor statutes may lead to the same conclusion, as they
are replete with statements that "all children with disabilities" should be served
under IDEA. 7' The legislative history of IDEA and its reauthorizations also
abound with statements that "all" disabled children should be served.76 Indeed,
the title of the original act was the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act.77 Despite the sheer quantity of references to "all" disabled children, and the
72. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433
(excluding disabled students from education meant: "public agencies and taxpayers will
spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes of these individuals to maintain such persons
as dependents and in a minimally acceptable lifestyle. With proper education services,
many would be able to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of
being forced to remain burdens. Others, through such services, would increase their
independence, thus reducing their dependence on society."); H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 9
(1975) ("The long-range implications are that taxpayers will spend many billions of
dollars over the lifetime of these handicapped individuals simply to maintain such
persons as dependents on welfare and often in institutions. With proper educational
services many ofthese handicapped children would be able to become productive citizens
contributing to society instead of being left to remain burdens on society."); see also
Melvin, supra note 44, at 618; Weinstein, supra note 15, at 515.
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)-(d) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.1(a) (2003).
74. H.R. 1350, 108th Cong. § 601(d) (2003); S. 1248, 108th Cong. § 601(d)
(2003). The House Report accompanying the bill also provided that "[t]he purpose of
special education and related services is to ensure that children with disabilities are able
to focus on their strengths and interests to become integrated into the mainstream of
American society." H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 86 (2003).
75. IDEA references "all children with disabilities" in over twenty different
provisions. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d), 141 1(b)(2)(C), 141 l(e)(2)(B), 141 l(g)(4),
1412(a)(1)-(2), 1412(a)(3)(A), 141 2(a)(1 0)(B)(i), 1412 (a)(1 8)(C), 141 3 (g)(l), 141 3(g)(3 )
1413(i)(1), 1419(b)(2), 1419(g)(2) (2000). The federal regulations also refer to "all
children with disabilities" in over twenty different provisions. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§
300.121(a), 300.121 (b)(2)(ii), 300.122(a), 300.123,300.124,300.128(a), 300.136(b)(4),
300.153(b), 300.245(a)(2), 300.300(a)-(b), 300.304 (2003). The First Circuit identified
eight separate parts of IDEA's predecessor statute, the EAHCA, mentioning "all"
handicapped children. Timothy W. ex rel. Cynthia W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 875
F.2d 954, 959-60 (1st Cir. 1989).
76. See Timothy W., 875 F.2d at 962-68 (summarizing pertinent legislative history).
77. Id. at 959; see also Brooke Whitted, Educational Benefits After Timothy W.:
Where Do We Go from Here?, 68 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 549, 551-52 (1991).
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rhetoric in the case law78 and legislative history, it is beyond dispute that not all
children diagnosed with disabilities are IDEA eligible.79
Rather, IDEA defines an eligible "child with a disability" as a child with
"mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or
language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious
emotional disturbance ... , orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain
injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities."80 States set
the criteria for establishing the existence of an enumerated disability, typically
requiring a medical certification or diagnosis.8" Accordingly, the first significant
limitation on eligibility is that the child must have one of the enumerated
disabilities.82
78. See, e.g., Timothy W., 875 F.2d at 961; Kruelle v. New Castle County Sch.
Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 690, 695 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The Education Act embodies a strong
federal policyto provide an appropriate education for every handicapped child" and there
was an "unequivocal congressional directive to provide an appropriate education for all
children regardless of the severity of the handicap."); Quintana ex rel. Padilla v. Dep't
of Educ., 30 IDELR 503 (P.R. Cir. Ct. App. 1998) (all handicapped children are entitled
to a free appropriate public education).
79. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 29 IDELR 690, 696 (Ala. SEA 1998); D.B.,
507 EHLR 303 (Conn. SEA 1985); Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch. Sys., 27 IDELR 756
(Tenn. SEA 1997); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 48 ("Not every
student with a disability in elementary, middle or high school receives special education
services because his or her disability does not impair their abilityto learn to such a degree
that special education services are necessary."); BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A.
GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
LAW 13:5 (1991) ("Not all children with disabilities are covered by [IDEA]: rather, only
those handicapped children who are educationally handicapped fall within the scope of
the Act."); Streett, supra note 7, at 43 ("Not all children with disabilities are eligible.").
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2000). The statute enumerates only ten qualifying
disabilities whereas the regulations enumerate thirteen separate disabilities. 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.7(c)(l)-(13) (2003). The disparity is explained by the fact that the regulations
separately define certain combinations of disabilities identified in the statute, id. §
300.7(c)(2) ("deaf-blindness"); id. § 300.7(c)(7) ("multiple disabilities"), and further
define deafness separately from hearing impairment. Id. § 300.7(c)(3), (5).
81. States employ various approaches to establish the existence of an enumerated
disability, but most require a medical diagnosis or certification. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 23.
82. The exception to this limitation is that states may, at their discretion, define
"child with a disability" between ages three and nine to include children "experiencing
developmental delays [in] . . . physical development, cognitive development,
communication development, social or emotional development, or adaptive
development." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B)(i) (2000). The enhanced flexibility for this age
group that results from eliminating the specific disabling categories stems from the
"recognition that it is sometimes difficult to pinpoint a child's disability during the early
developmental years." Dixie Snow Huefner, TheIndividuals with Disabilities Education
17
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Further, the enumerated disability must "adversely affect[] a child's
educational performance" to be considered qualifying.83 In other words, a
disability is not qualifying and eligibility does not attach, despite a medical
diagnosis, unless the disability "adversely affects a child's educational
performance."84  The only disability excepted from the requirement is specific
learning disability ("SLD").85 Accordingly, the second significant limitation on
eligibility, for nine of the ten enumerated disabilities, is that the disability must
adversely affect educational performance.
Finally, IDEA defines an eligible child as a child with a qualifying disability
"who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services." 6 The
"needs special education" requirement for eligibility is emphasized throughout
the statute and its regulations and is the final significant limitation on IDEA
eligibility. a7
The statutory procedures that schools must follow to find a child eligible are
straightforward.88 Each child suspected of a disability must be assessed and
evaluated. 9 Once the evaluation is complete, an eligibility team comprised of
the parents and a team of professionals determine whether the child is IDEA
eligible.90 In summary, to fird IDEA eligibility, the eligibility team must find
Act Amendments of 1997, 122 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1103, 1104 (1998).
83. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(1), (3)-(6), (8), (9), (11)-(13) (2003). The definitions of
deaf-blindness and multiple disabilities require that the conditions "must cause[] ...
educational needs" in order to qualify. Id. § 300.7(c)(2), (7); see also Ketterman, supra
note 4, at 937.
84. Shum, supra note 17, at 240-41.
85. Even SLD implies educational difficultyby requiring "a disorder... [that] may
manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do
mathematical calculations," all components of educational performance. 20 U.S.C. §
1401(26)(A) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(10)(i) (2003); see also Letter to Lybarger, 17
EHLR 54,55 (OSEP 1990) (inquirer notes that even SLD implies educational difficulty).
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(ii) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a) (2003). Children ages
three through nine who the state has discretion to identify as experiencing developmental
delays also must "need[] special education and related services" to be eligible. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(3)(b)(ii) (2000).
87. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(3)(B), 1414(c)(l)(B)(iii) (2000). The
regulations mention the "need" for special education at least twelve times. See, e.g., 34
C.F.R. §§ 300.125(a)(1)(i), 300.302, 300.313(b)(l), 300.342(b)(1)(i), 300.343(b)(2),
300.347(a)(3), 300.500(b)(2), 300.532(a)(2), 300.523(d), 300.523(h), 300.535(b)
300.543(a)(6) (2003).
88. For a detailed discussion of the evaluation procedures to determine eligibility,
see Goldman, supra note 18, at 276-78, Streett, supra note 7, at 39-40, Shum, supra note
17, at 237-38, and Weinstein, supra note 15, at 507-09.
89. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411(b)-(c), 1412(a), 1414(a) (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§
300.125(a)(1)(i), 300.320 (2003).
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4) (2000).
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that the child is of qualifying age9 and (1) has an enumerated disability,92 (2) the
disability adversely affects educational performance,93 and (3) by reason thereof
the child needs special education.94 Because the "adversely affects" requirement
is merely a subpart of finding a qualifying disability, most courts and hearing
officers identify only a two-part test for IDEA eligibility.9" Yet it is clear that
each of the three hurdles must be surpassed for eligibility to attach and that the
second hurdle is removed only for children with learning disabilities.96
91. States are required to serve children ages six through seventeen and may choose
to not serve children from the ages of three through five and eighteen through twenty-one
if children without disabilities of the same ages are not provided public education. Id.
§ 1412(a)( 1 )(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.122(a)(1), 300.300(b)(5) (2003). For discussion of
the age requirements under IDEA, see WEBER, supra note 28, § 2.1. See also 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(1)(A) (2000).
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.7(a)(1), 300.7(c) (2003).
93. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c) (2003).
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(1) (2003).
95. See, e.g., Babicz v. Sch. Bd., 135 F.3d 1420, 1422 n.10 (1 1th Cir. 1998) ("The
first prong includes those suffering from a long list of handicaps and 'other health
impairments' such as asthma, and, the second prong includes those, 'who, by reason
thereof, need special education and related services."') (citations omitted); W. Chester
Area Sch. Dist. v. Bruce C., 194 F. Supp. 2d 417,420 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (There is a "two-
part test for determining whether a student is entitled to an IEP. First, the student must
have a qualifying disability, and, second, the student must 'need special education."');
Eric H. ex rel. Gary H. v. Judson Indep. Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A. SA01CA0804-NN, 2002
WL 31396140, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2002) ("to qualify for special education, a
student (1) must have one or more of the disabilities recognized by IDEA and (2) need
special education services") (footnotes omitted); Bd. of Educ., 29 IDELR 122, 125 (N.Y.
SEA 1998) ("a child must not only have a specific physical or mental condition, but such
condition must adversely impact upon the child's performance to the extent that he or she
requires special education"); Corvallis Sch. Dist. 509J, 28 IDELR 1026 (Or. SEA 1998)
("Even if the evidence showed that the student met all four of the minimum criteria for
autism, this would not, by itself be enough. It must also be established that the disability
adversely impacts the student's educational performance and the student requires special
education as a result of the disability. The need for special education is an essential, and
separate, requirement.") (citations omitted); Aransas County Indep. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR
141 (Tex. SEA 1998) ("First, the student must have a specified physical or mental
impairment identified through an appropriate evaluation. Second, the student must
evidence a need for special education services by an inability to progress in a regular
education program."); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 23;
Champagne, supra note 33, at 589 ("The statute's technical definition creates a two-part
test. First, the child must have at least one of the listed handicapping conditions.
Second, that condition must result in a need for special education.").
96. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Belleville Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 118, 672 F. Supp.
342, 344 (S.D. I11. 1987) ("three tests must be met before [IDEA] can be made to apply
in this case: 1) [an enumerated disability must exist], 2) which adversely affects a child's
educational performance, and 3) which requires special education and related services").
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Because application of the age requirement is relatively straightforward and
rarely litigated, it is not analyzed in this Article.97 Establishing an enumerated
disability is also not addressed, despite its complexity and the fact it is often
litigated, because it is more the domain of the medical and psychiatric fields than
the legal field. Instead, this Article focuses on the "adversely affects educational
performance" and "needs special education" eligibility requirements, which often
are determinative of eligibility for children passing from grade to grade in
general education.
1I. "ADVERSELY AFFECTS EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE"
IDEA eligibility initially hinges on the existence of a disability that
"adversely affects the child's educational performance.""8 Plainly stated, the
disability must lead to "educational" problems. Yet IDEA does not inform
decision-makers as to which problems are educational and qualify and which are
non-educational and do not qualify, leaving the term "adversely affects
educational performance" undefined.99 This does not stop courts and hearing
officers from improperly inventing federal and universal meanings for these
terms rather than deferring to state standards. The result is wildly varied
interpretations of these terms by decision-makers. Some require that academic
performance be adversely affected before eligibility attaches, while others find
eligibility when any aspect of the human experience is adversely affected,
resulting in both over and under-identification. Some find that the adverse effect
must be significant before eligibility attaches while others find that any effect
suffices. These few examples establish the deleterious effects on children from
decision-makers' misunderstanding of the "adversely affects educational
performance" requirement.' °
97. The difficult issue in applying the age requirement arises when the child is past
the age of majority yet still seeks IDEA eligibility. For a review of these cases and
discussion of IDEA's age requirements, see WEBER, supra note 28, § 2.1.
98. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
99. J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2000); Yankton
Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369, 1375 (8th Cir. 1996); Letter to Lillie/Felton, 23
IDELR 714, 716 (OSEP 1994).
100. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing existence of and
problems resulting from over and under-identification of students).
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A. "Educational Performance"
1. The Problem
The controversy in defining "educational performance" is whether it means
exclusively academic performance, such as grades and standardized test scores,
or whether it also encompasses non-academic performance, such as behavior,
emotional development, and interpersonal relationships.'0 ' The ramifications on
IDEA eligibility are significant. If the child cannot form social relations, or
attend school regularly, or control behavior, yet performs well academically,
does the child's disability adversely affect educational performance? If so, the
child is entitled to IDEA's extensive benefits, assuming the child needs special
education. If not, the child is not eligible no matter the need for special
education. Defining educational performance, therefore, defines the scope of
IDEA by identifying the problems it seeks to capture and address.
The disagreement among the courts and hearing officers results from their
improper attempts to glean a federal definition of educational performance where
no such universal definition exists or was intended.' 2 Inventing a federal
definition of educational performance is tempting because "the term.. . is so
essential an element in eligibility criteria, it is difficult to understand why it was
not defined in the original legislation or in subsequent regulation-making or
interpretation."'0 3 In yielding to the temptation, decision-makers often apply
personal notions of which student problems should be considered educational in
finding a federal definition of educational performance that is limited to
exclusively academic performance.
For example, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Board of Education of the State of
Connecticut, the child became depressed, violent, refused to go to school and
was hospitalized.' ° The court found the child ineligible, despite testimony that
he needed a residential placement, because his emotional "difficulties did not
adversely affect his educational performance as required by federal and state law.
The plaintiff's academic performance (both his grades and his achievement test
101. See cases cited infra notes 104-13, 116-21; see also Callegary, supra note 25,
at 187, 188 ("Several courts have stated that when examining whether there is an adverse
affect on educational performance, an IEP Team should not limit their review to
academic progress but should also examine the student's progress socially and
emotionally" but "some courts have focused only on academic progress when analyzing
whether the child's emotional problems were having an adverse affect on his or her
educational performance."); id. at 185 ("Case law that examines whether a child has an
emotional disturbance often turns on the courts' interpretation of the adverse affect clause
102. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
103. Letter to Lybarger, 17 EHLR 54, 55 (OSEP 1990).
104. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 753 F. Supp. 65, 66, 69-70 (D. Conn. 1990).
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results) before, during, and after his hospitalization were satisfactory or
above."'0 5 The court provided no justification for its conclusion that a child's
poor behavior alone is not educational performance unless it leads to lower
grades.1
0 6
Similarly, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Belleville Public School District No. 118,
the court found that IDEA "would apply to AIDS victims only if their physical
condition is such that it adversely affects their educational performance; i.e.,
their ability to learn and to do the required classroom work."' °7 The court simply
concluded that excessive absenteeism does not adversely affect educational
performance unless it "has resulted in either lower grades or a decreased level
of comprehension or ability to learn."' ' Many decision-makers similarly do not
consider attendance alone as educational performance. 9
Likewise, in In re Child with Disabilities, the hearing officer held that a
gifted child receiving good grades did not have an emotional disability that
adversely affected educational performance despite the child having "serious but
fluctuating difficulties with peer relations" and "an inability to build or maintain
105. Id. at 70 (footnote omitted); see also id. ("In sum, there was sufficient
evidence presented to the state hearing officer from which she reasonably concluded that
the plaintiffs education was not significantly impeded or adversely affected by his
behavior problems and that he was therefore not entitled to special education.").
106. See also Gregory M. ex rel. Ernest M. v. State Bd. of Educ., 891 F. Supp. 695,
702 (D. Conn. 1995) (finding child ineligible because "[g]iven [his] C level grades and
his functioning in the mainstream classroom without significant disruption, there was
sufficient evidence from which the hearing officer reasonably concluded that Gregory's
education was not significantly impeded or adversely affected by his behavioral
difficulties"); Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR 51,55 (Cal. SEA 1999) (Looking
only at the student's academic record, the hearing officer concluded that "there is no
indication that STUDENT's academic performance was in anyway adversely affected by
his depression. Therefore ... STUDENT cannot be found to be eligible for special
education services under the category of emotionally disturbed.").
107. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Belleville Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 118, 672 F. Supp. 342, 345
(S.D. Il. 1987). The Belleville ruling emanates from unique circumstances. The court
agreed with the parents in holding that the child was not IDEA eligible and therefore did
not need to exhaust administrative remedies before filing the lawsuit in federal court. Id.
108. Id. at 344 n.3.
109. See, e.g., Houston County Pub. Sch. Sys., 35 IDELR 25 (Ala. SEA 2001)
(child's Attention Deficit Disorder ("ADD") did not adversely affect his grades, rather
his failure to attend led to decreased grades; however, the child's failure to attend school
was a result of his ADD); West Haven Bd. of Educ., 37 IDELR 56,64 (Conn. SEA 2001)
(child with ADD suspended for drugs and alcohol, and later expelled for stealing, did not
fulfill "adversely affects" prong because "his academic performance is mostly in the
above average range in an academically challenging program"); Old Orchard Beach Sch.
Dep't, 21 IDELR 1084, 1087 (Me. SEA 1994) ("The school needs to provide an
educational program and make it assessible but they can not make the AG attend school
or learn from it.").
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satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers.""'  The hearing
officer, like many others, provided no rationalization for finding that social
relations are not educational performance."' Communication and physical
performance are also often excluded from the definition of educational
performance without justification." 2  These courts and hearing officers
essentially employ their own notions of what constitutes educational
performance when inventing a narrow federal definition. "3
The resulting academic centered definition results in educators not "serving
students who have deficits in their interpersonal, social, and employment skills
that adversely affect their in-school activities and relationships but may not affect
their acquisition of academic skills.""' 4 The narrow meaning of educational
performance is one reason that emotionally disturbed children are the most
under-identified category of disabled children. These children can often perform
well academically but cannot form social relations, control their behavior or
attend the regular classroom consistently.'
110. In re Child with Disabilities, 19 IDELR 198, 200 (Conn. SEA 1992).
111. See, e.g., Roane County Sch. Sys. v. Ned A., 22 IDELR 574, 586 (E.D. Tenn.
1995) (gifted child with excellent academic performance was found ineligible because
"[h]is educational performance, notwithstanding a slight decrease in his IQ level, has not
been adversely affected by his socialization problems"); In re Hollister Sch. Dist., 26
IDELR 632, 660 (Cal. SEA 1997) (child's significant emotional problems, which
resulted in underdeveloped social and emotional skills, difficulty in interpersonal
relationships and aggressive behaviors at home, did not adversely affect his educational
performance because the child "has always been mainstreamed in regular education
classes and has consistently received better than passing grades"); Fauquier County Pub.
Sch., 20 IDELR 579, 584 (Va. SEA 1993) (without citing authority, hearing officer held
that "the concept of 'education' may encompass more [than] mere academic instruction,
and implies some development of emotional maturity and social skills, [but] the law does
not require respondent to treat Child's emotional disturbance").
112. See, e.g., St. Clair County Bd. of Educ., 29 IDELR 688, 696 (Ala. SEA 1998)
(orthopedic impairment did not adversely affect child's educational performance because
she received good grades without special education); Bd. of Educ., 29 IDELR 122, 128
(N.Y. SEA 1998) (child with autism that resulted in "articulation difficulties" and
"difficulty initiating and maintaining conversations with his peers" did not meet
"adversely affects" requirement because "[a]cademically, he is achieving at a rate which
is commensurate with his cognitive ability").
113. See also Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 29 IDELR 690 (Ala. SEA 1998)
(child's asthma did not adversely affect her educational performance because it did not
affect her academic performance); Bd. of Educ., 21 IDELR 1024, 1033 (N.Y. SEA 1994)
("I do not agree with their assertion that the child's academic performance is only one
area to be considered in determining whether he has a learning disability.").
114. Glennon, supra note 18, at 334; see supra note 41 (discussing deleterious
effects of under-identification).
115. Glennon, supra note 18, at 355-56 ("[M]any schools have interpreted
educational performance to be limited to academic performance. Thus, students who
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The analysis employed by the courts and hearing officers finding children
with non-academic problems within the grasp of IDEA is also flawed, as it
conjures a fictitious federal definition of educational performance without limits.
Typically, these decision-makers glean a federal definition of educational
performance from parts of IDEA that do not deal with eligibility. For example,
in Greenland School District v. Amy N., the child's Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") led to intense feelings of anxiety,
distractibility, and difficulty with organization, staying on task, and following
instructions."" The school district found the child ineligible because it believed
her success in the regular classroom with interventions meant her ADHD did not
adversely affect her educational performance. "7 The court disagreed, and
relying on IDEA's evaluation procedures, held that "grades and test results alone
are not the proper measure of a child's educational performance.""' 8  It
essentially concluded that all areas of performance for which IDEA requires
evaluation fall within the federal definition of educational performance. This
definition has no limits, however, as IDEA requires that children be evaluated
"in all areas [related to the] suspected disability."" 9
A different tack, with the same result, was employed in In re Kristopher H.,
where the district refused IDEA eligibility to a child that was distractible and had
problems staying on task and in social relationships, relying on the fact that he
performed at grade level. 20 The hearing officer disagreed, and turning to the
dictionary, found that educational performance "includes not only the narrow
conception of instruction, to which it was formerly limited, but embraces all
forms of human experience."''
maintain their academic performance but who cannot socialize with peers or school
personnel may be denied the special education they need to develop skills in those
areas.") (footnotes omitted); Hannon, supra note 17, at 722 (SED "indicates emotional
problems that may or may not result in poor academic performance."); see supra note 41
(discussing significant problem of under-identification of emotionally disturbed
children).
116. Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., No. CIV. 02-136-JD, 2003 WL 1343023, at
*1-2 (D.N.H. Mar. 19, 2003).
117. Id. at *3.
118. Id. at *8.
119. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(C) (2000).
120. In re Kristopher H., 507 EHLR 183, 187 (Wash. SEA 1985); see also id. at
183 ("Most importantly, any behavioral maladjustment/inappropriateness has not
adversely affected educational performance. In a typically structured regular classroom
setting, Kris is an actively involved and productive learner. Actual scholastic
achievement (academic skills) are commensurate with or above chronological age/grade
placement and cognitive potential.").
121. Id. at 187; see also Quintana ex rel. Padilla v. Dep't of Educ., 30 IDELR 503,
506 (P.R. Cir. Ct. App. 1998) (teaching exclusively communication skills is "education"
because it "would contribute to his development as a human being, which is the ultimate
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These unlimited federal definitions of educational performance mean that
the mere existence of a disability fulfills the "adversely affects educational
performance" prong and essentially reads the limitation out of IDEA."2 The
result is a significant over-identification of children as these requirements each
act separately to limit eligibility.'23 At best, these vague definitions leave
eligibility teams without any standards to draw lines between non-academic
problems that qualify and those that don't. Because there is no federal definition
of educational performance, the issue is which standards should be consulted in
deciding if the adversely affected performance is educational or non-educational.
2. The Solution
Rather than rely on Noah Webster's or judges' notions of when a child's
problems are educational and qualifying, or an implied definition from the
federal government, decision-makers should instead turn to the recognized
experts in education to define educational performance--states and localities.
24
Considering that Congress protected state control over education by
incorporating state standards into IDEA's "free appropriate public education"
criteria, 21 it is no surprise that at least one circuit court, 26 scholars,"27 and likely
the Office of Special Educational Programs ("OSEP")"2 1 (the federal body in
purpose of education," or at least learning communication allows education).
122. See also Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 900 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (D.S.D.
1995) (stating in dicta that the "adversely affects" requirement does not "narrow[]
eligibility for special education"), aff'd, 93 F.3d 1369 (8th Cir. 1996). The court
concluded that if the child needs special education she necessarily has qualifying
educational problems. The Eighth Circuit affirmed but analyzed each requirement
separately. Id.
123. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
124. Accordingly, I reject Professor Glennon's solution that "Congress should..
define educational performance" as states and localities must maintain their primacy in
education. Glennon, supra note 18, at 356.
125. See supra notes 60-61.
126. J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2000).
127. See, e.g., Callegary, supra note 25, at 187; Shum, supra note 17, at 241;
Streett, supra note 7, at 44.
128. OSEP is less than clear on the subject. In Letter to Anonymous, 213 EHLR
247, 248-49 (OSEP 1989), OSEP held that the definition of "adversely affects
educational performance" is left to states to define, and that the curriculum and areas of
performance tracked by the schools should be consulted. Id. However, in the same year,
OSEP relied on IDEA's IEP and evaluation requirements, rather than state standards, to
conclude that educational performance includes "non-academic as well as academic
areas." Letter to Lybarger, 17 EHLR 54, 56 (OSEP 1989); see also Letter to Pawlisch,
24 IDELR 959, 962 (OSEP 1995). A mere five years later OSEP refused to develop a
"single definition" of educational performance. Letter to Lillie/Felton, 23 IDELR 714
25
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charge of administering IDEA'29), conclude that state educational standards are
also incorporated into IDEA's eligibility criteria, even without their express
incorporation.
Interpreting a federal definition of educational performance where none
exists would destroy the delicate balance Congress drew between state control
over education and the federal interests in ensuring disabled children have access
to education to achieve self-sufficiency. A federal definition of the areas of
educational performance expected of students in public schools would entirely
displace states' "traditional latitude to determine appropriate subjects of
instruction."' 30  One state may deem interpersonal relationships to be an
important educational performance expected of its students and instruct in that
area, while another may find emotional development to be educational
performance and instruct in that area, while yet another may focus exclusively
on academic performance. If the federal definition of educational performance
includes or excludes these areas of performance, the state's education system
will transmit the values of the federal government rather than its community.
While deferring to states to define educational performance results in fifty
different eligibility standards, it is certainly better than the alternative of making
states and localities the mere teaching conduits of federal values. Varied
eligibility standards are also not disconcerting in light of the fact that the "free
appropriate public education" due eligible students also incorporates differing
state standards.
Furthermore, courts are particularly ill equipped to glean a federal definition
of educational performance because they "lack the 'specialized knowledge and
experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difficult questions of educational
policy."""' Courts are simply not as capable as educators to determine which
areas of performance by a student are educational and which are not.'32 Asking
(OSEP 1994). Because OSEP never expressly overruled its 1989 policy statement that
states define educational performance and because OSEP refuses to develop a single
definition of educational performance, OSEP likely continues to defer to states to define
the term despite its broad definition of the term as encompassing academic and non-
academic areas.
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (2000).
130. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 241 (1990).
131. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,208 (1982) (citing San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973)); see also Regents of Univ. of Mich. v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (noting Supreme Court's "reluctance to trench on the
prerogatives of state and local educational institutions" as federal courts are ill-suited to
"evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by"
experts in the field); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206 (finding that IDEA is not "an invitation to
the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the
school authorities which they review").
132. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
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ajudge to define educational performance is akin to asking an educator to define
stare decisis or constitutional free speech rights. The experts immersed in
education daily can best identify what is educational performance and what is
not. Accordingly, states, rather than the federal government, judges and hearing
officers, are the best authority to bring meaning to the term "educational
performance."'33
While deferring to states to define educational performance is not a
revolutionary concept, application of this concept by decision-makers certainly
is revolutionary, as shown by the above decisions. The lone exception is the
Second Circuit, which summarily concluded in J.D. ex rel. JD. v. Pawlet School
District that IDEA leaves it to each state to define the terms "adversely affects"
and "educational performance."'34 Ascertaining the state standard was a simple
endeavor inJ.D. because Vermont expressly defined "educational performance"
in its regulations regarding disabled students as "oral expression," "listening
comprehension," "written expression," "basic reading skills," "reading
comprehension," "mathematics calculation," "mathematics reasoning," and
"motor skills."' 35 The Second Circuit easily found the child ineligible because
his problems--"difficulty with interpersonal relationships and negative
feelings"'a6 -were not included in this definition.
37
The difficulty arises in the states that do not specifically define educational
performance in their regulations dealing with disabled children. Most states do
not, leaving decision-makers at a loss as to which state standards bring meaning
to the term. Educators know exactly where to turn, though, as they identify the
educational performance they expect of students by the areas of instruction
required in the curriculum and in the areas of performance formally tracked.
("Federal courts do not possess the capabilities of state and local governments in
addressing difficult educational problems.").
133. Even if the federal government should define educational performance, it has
refused to do so. See supra note 99.
134. J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2000).
135. Id. (citing VT. SPECIAL EDUC. REGS. § 2362(2)(b), (3)).
136. Id. at 68.
137. Id. The court concluded that "J.D.'s basic skills, and hence his educational
performance, were not adversely affected by his disability within the meaning of the
Vermont Rule." Id. at 67. The child earned As and Bs and performed well above grade
level. Id. at 63.
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a. Curriculum
The official state curriculum, or curriculum guidelines," 8 identifies the
areas of instruction required by the state, i.e. what the state wants its children to
know, "'39 and therefore the educational performance the state expects of its
students. There is simply no clearer statement of what the state considers
educational performance than what it requires students to be taught as
memorialized in its curriculum.
Referring to the state curriculum to define educational performance is not
only pedagogically sound, it is virtually mandated by IDEA. While it is
inappropriate for decision-makers to derive a federal definition of educational
performance from sections of IDEA not dealing with eligibility, it is certainly
appropriate to consult these sections when ascertaining which parts of state law
give meaning to the term "educational performance." It is instructive, for
example, that IDEA's regulations acknowledge that a state's "educational
standards" are embodied in its general curriculum. 4 ° It is more instructive that
eligibility evaluations must include "information related to enabling the child to
be involved in and progress in the general curriculum.''. If that were not
enough, IDEA provides that a child's current level of "educational performance"
for programming purposes is "the child's involvement and progress in the
general curriculum" (i.e. the same curriculum as for nondisabled children). 42
138. States have the primary authority to select the curriculum, yet it is well settled
that local school boards make curriculum decisions as well. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853,864 (1982) ("local school boards must be permitted 'to establish and
apply their curriculum'); Pratt v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 670 F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1982)
(the school board's "comprehensive powers and substantial discretion" include "the
authority to determine the curriculum that is most suitable for students and the teaching
methods that are to be employed, including the educational tools to be used"); see also
Patricia L. Van Dom, Note, Proposal for a "Lawful" Public School Curriculum:
Preventive Law from a Societal Perspective, 28 IND. L. REV. 477, 492 (1995).
139. HERBERT M. KLIEBARD, FORGING THE AMERICAN CURRICULUM, at xii (1992);
Judith A. Monsaas et al., Georgia P-16 Initiative: Creating Change Through Higher
Standards for Students and Teachers, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 179, 183 (1998) (the
curriculum defines "what students should know and be able to do"); Molly O'Brien, Free
at Last? Charter Schools and the "Deregulated" Curriculum, 34 AKRON L. REV. 137,
138 (2000) (the curriculum identifies "what to teach" and "what the society wants its
children to know").
140. 34 C.F.R. § 26(a)(3)(ii) (2003).
141. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(b) (2003).
142. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(1)(i) (2003).
IDEA is replete with statements that eligible children must be able to access the general
curriculum. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (2000) (An IEP must include a
"statement of the special education and related services . . . to be provided to the child
• . . [t]o be involved and progress in the general curriculum."); 34 C.F.R. §
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These references establish that a child's educational performance for eligibility
should also be determined by reference to the general curriculum.
Despite the plain language in IDEA explaining that its references to the
general curriculum mean the entire curriculum, 43 it is arguable that IDEA's
references are only to the academic or graded curriculum. There is facial support
in Supreme Court decisions narrowly defining the term "curriculum" in other
contexts. For example, in Board of Education of the Westside Community
Schools v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, the Supreme Court, relying on dictionary
definitions, held that "curriculum" means only "the whole body of courses
offered""' by the school and not "anything remotely related to abstract
educational goals."' 45 This activity-based definition was employed in finding
that the chess club, scuba club and peer advocate club were "noncurriculum
related" clubs under the Equal Access Act, and thus the school had to allow
equal access by the "noncurriculum related" religious club. 4 ' The circumscribed
definition of "curriculum" was necessary because including the school's broad
educational goals rendered the Equal Access Act "hortatory."' 47
The exact opposite conclusion is true under IDEA, as all areas of instruction
in the curriculum, and not just the course listings, infuse meaning into the term
"educational performance." A state may require instruction in good manners and
therefore expect the educational performance of good manners from its students.
The fact that a course on manners is not offered or that students' manners are not
graded should not preclude eligibility for a child whose disability adversely
affects manners. If instruction in an area is required it is certainly something the
state wants its students to know, whether or not it is graded, and the area of
instruction is therefore educational performance by students.
300.347(a)(3)(ii) (2003); id. pt. 300, app. A, at 101 ("The requirements regarding services
provided to address a child's present levels of educational performance and to make
progress toward the identified goals reinforce the emphasis on progress in the general
curriculum .... ); id. at 100 ("The IEP requirements under Part B of the IDEA
emphasize the importance of three core concepts: ... the involvement and progress of
each child with a disability in the general curriculum including addressing the unique
needs that arise out of the child's disability .... Accordingly, the evaluation and IEP
provisions of Part B place great emphasis on the involvement and progress of children
with disabilities in the general curriculum. (The term 'general curriculum,' as used in
these regulations, including this Appendix, refers to the curriculum that is used with
nondisabled children.)"); id. at 101 ("The strong emphasis in Part B on linking the
educational program of children with disabilities to the general curriculum is reflected
in § 30 0.347(a)(2) . .
143. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(1)(i) (2003).
144. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 237 (1990).
145. Id. at 244.
146. Id. at 246-47.
147. Id. at 244.
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Furthermore, I do not propose, as in Mergens, that the state's "abstract
educational goals" be included in the definition of "curriculum," and thereby
educational performance. Rather, only the concrete areas of required instruction
identified in the curriculum define educational performance. Many states
identify broad goals for their students. 48 However, it is the curriculum that is
taught the students to reach those goals that defines educational performance, not
the aspirational goals themselves. The state essentially defines the educational
performance it expects of its students to reach the broad goals through its
curriculum. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's holding inMergens that abstract
educational goals are not part of the curriculum does not mean that IDEA's
references to curriculum are limited only to the academic or graded curriculum.
The same is true of the narrow activity-based meaning of "curriculum" the
Supreme Court provided in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, when it
employed a new standard for regulating school speech in curriculum-based
activities-in that case the school newspaper.'49 The Court did not expressly
define "curriculum," but noted that the term included "school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school." 50 Because the Court needed only to determine which
school activities were part of the curriculum, its narrow definition is inapplicable
to IDEA which hinges eligibility on educational performance, not activities
which bear the imprimatur of the school.
The legislative history being created for the new reauthorized IDEA also
supports the argument that IDEA's references to "curriculum" are only to the
academic or graded curriculum. The House Report for the reauthorized IDEA
contains several statements that the IEP must "specifically address the child's
academic achievement" but leaves the references to "curriculum" unchanged.",
However, the references to academic achievement are designed to align IDEA
with the academic based standards of the new No Child Left Behind Act and are
not meant to mutually exclude other areas of performance.'52 The legislative
148. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.645 1(1)(b) (Michie 2000); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 120B. 11.1(b) (West 2000).
149. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
150. Id. at 271.
151. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 136 (2003); see also id. at 108 ("[Tlhe bill makes
several important changes to improve the focus of the IEP on the educational program
and the academic achievement of children with disabilities.").
152. Id. at 83 ("Aligning the IDEA's accountability system with NCLB is essential
to ensuring that children with disabilities have the chance to learn and succeed
academically ...."); id. at 92 ("The Committee believes that these are important
activities and are an essential component of the effort to improve academic achievement
.... Aligning the IDEA's accountability system with the No Child Left Behind Act is
essential to ensuring that children with disabilities have the chance to learn and succeed
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history also contains numerous references to the non-academic needs of eligible
children."5 3
In summary, there is nothing in IDEA or its legislative history that supports
the conclusion that its references to "curriculum" are exclusively to the academic
or graded curriculum and therefore that "educational performance" is limited
only to performance that is graded. The cases defining the free appropriate
public education to be provided eligible children also dispel this notion. In
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v.
Rowley,"5 4 the Supreme Court held that an eligible deaf child performing above
average and easily passing from grade to grade with limited IDEA services was
not entitled to a full-time sign language interpreter because the school district
academically."); id. at 96 ("The No Child Left Behind Act established a rigorous
accountability system for States and local educational agencies to ensure that all children,
including children with disabilities, are held to high academic achievement standards
153. See, e.g., id. at 12 (identifying prereferral services for children who need
behavior and academic support); id. at 104 ("The Committee also encourages local
educational agencies to provide positive behavior interventions and supports to children
that have demonstrated behavioral problems within school."); id. at 106 ("The bill makes
changes to the reevaluation process to enable the local educational agency to reevaluate
the child if his or her educational needs, including improved academic achievement,
make such a reevaluation necessary.").
154. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Rowley is only briefly summarized here as virtually
every scholarly work on IDEA to date analyzes the case and its progeny. For in-depth
discussions of Rowley, see Cathy A. Broadwell & John C. Walden, "Free Appropriate
Public Education" After Rowley: An Analysis of Recent Court Decisions, 18 J.L. &
EDUC. 35, 37-41 (1988); Callegary, supra note 25, at 174-77; Daniel & Coriell, supra
note 20, at 576-93 (criticizing Rowley); Hill, supra note 17, at 157-62; Huefner, supra
note 7, at 488-95 (criticizing Rowley for not examining the child's progress on IEP
goals); Minow, supra note 8, at 189-91 (explaining Rowley based on notions of self-
sufficiency); Myers & Jenson, supra note 7, at 409-16; Tucker, supra note 35, at 235
(criticizing Rowley); Weber, supra note 7, at 367-74; Wegner, supra note 12, at 181-94
(concluding Rowley was correctly decided); Kenneth G. Anderson, Comment, The
Meaning of Appropriate Education to Handicapped Children Under the EHCA: The
Impact of Rowley, 14 Sw. U. L. REv. 521, 538 (1984) (arguing congressional funding
increase and recognition of handicapped children's dependence on schools indicate
congressional desire to guarantee more than some benefit); Patricia L. Arcuri, Note,
Handicapped Children-Statutory Mandate for "Free Appropriate Public Education"
Satisfied when Handicapped Benefit from Specialized Instruction and Support Services,
14 RUTGERS L.J. 989, 1000 (1983) (criticizing Rowley as contrary to Act); Boeckman,
supra note 44, at 866-67; Kathryn M. Coates, Comment, The Education of All
Handicapped Children Act Since 1975, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 51, 74 (1985); Dannenberg,
supra note 8, at 632-35; DeBerry, supra note 15, at 523-25; Eyer, supra note 7, at 620-
22; and Hannon, supra note 17, at 725-28, 733-35 (criticizing Rowley).
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was already providing her a "free appropriate public education."' 55 The Court
held that a school district fulfills its obligations to IDEA eligible children if it
follows IDEA's procedures and if the child's educational program is "reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits."'56 For disabled
children in the general education classroom, like the plaintiff, the Court found
that "educational benefit" is achieved when the educational program is
"reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance
from grade to grade." '57 But the Court expressly did not hold "that every
handicapped child who is advancing from grade to grade in a regular public
school system is automatically receiving a 'free appropriate public
education.'""5 " Rather, it considered such advancement "an important factor in
determining educational benefit."' 59
By finding that not every handicapped child who is advancing from grade
to grade in a regular public school system is being properly served under IDEA,
the Supreme Court recognized a class of IDEA eligible children who are
achieving in the graded areas of performance, yet need additional "educational
benefit." It follows that the adversely affected educational performance required
for eligibility may include more than just the graded areas of performance;
otherwise the class of children identified by the Court would not exist. By
defining "educational benefit" this way, Rowley virtually impels the conclusion
that educational performance for purposes of eligibility means all areas of
instruction in the curriculum and not just graded areas of instruction. 0
155. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185, 210.
156. Id. at 206-07; see also id. at 203 (FAPE is met "by providing personalized
instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally
from that instruction."); id. at 201 ("the 'basic floor of opportunity' provided by the Act
consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually
designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child").
157. Id. at 203-04.
158. Id. at 203 n.25. This holding is now codified at 34 C.F.R. Section
300.121 (e)(1) (2003) ("Each State shall ensure that FAPE is available to any individual
child with a disability who needs special education and related services, even though the
child is advancing from grade to grade."); and id. § 300.121(e)(2) ("The determination
that a child [advancing from grade to grade] is eligible under this part, must be made on
an individual basis by the group responsible within the child's LEA for making those
determinations.").
159. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203.
160. See also Mary P. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 919 F. Supp. 1173, 1180 (N.D. I11.
1996), amended by 934 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Il. 1996) (holding that educational
performance can mean more than a child's ability to meet academic criteria "[b]ecause
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that the sole test for an appropriate
education was advancement from grade to grade, or, in other words, academic
achievement, the court finds no authority from Rowley to impose such a requirement on
the test for eligibility in the present case"); Blazejewski ex rel. Blazejewski v. Bd. of
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Rowley's progeny lead to the same conclusion. Debate rages as to whether
the "educational benefit" that must be provided to eligible children includes non-
academic benefits. Courts employ a variety of analytical tools to decide the
issue, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article, but a majority of
courts hold that a child must progress in more than just graded areas in order to
be provided educational benefit and a free appropriate public education.'
6 1
Educ., 560 F. Supp. 701, 705 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that child's learning disability
adversely affected his educational performance even though he was advancing from
grade to grade because Rowley did not hold that "every handicapped child who is
advancing from grade to grade in a regular public school system is automatically
receiving a 'free appropriate education"'). But see Lyons ex rel. Alexander v. Smith, 829
F. Supp. 414, 418 (D.D.C. 1993) (finding that child with disability impacting social
adjustment did not have a disability that adversely affected educational performance
because, as Rowley held, "[t]he achievement of passing marks is one important factor in
determining educational benefit").
161. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d
1458, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) ("educational benefit is not limited to academic needs, but
includes the social and emotional needs that affect academic progress, school behavior,
and socialization"); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Everyone agrees that A.S. is exceptionally bright and thus was able to test appropriately
on standardized tests. This is not the sine qua non of 'educational benefit,' however.
'[T]he term "unique educational needs" [shall] be broadly construed to include the
handicapped child's academic, social, health, emotional, communicative, physical and
vocational needs."') (alterations in original) (citations omitted); Lenn v. Portland Sch.
Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1089-90 (1st Cir. 1993) (a child's placement must be intended
to address his academic, physical, emotional, and social needs); Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ. v. Breen, 864 F.2d 795 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744
F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1984); Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Charles F., No. CIV. 92-609-M, 1994
WL 485754, at *4-5 (D.N.H. Aug. 31, 1994). But see Gonzalez v. P.R. Dep't of Educ.,
254 F.3d 350, 352 (1st Cir. 2001) (behavior must be addressed only when it interferes
with a child's ability to "learn" rather than treating behavior itself as an area of
educational benefit). For an excellent analysis of cases determining "whether learning
behavioral controls, or other social and emotional skills, are themselves part of aprogram
of special education and related services" and an argument "that programs designed to
address behavioral, emotional and social skills" are educational in nature, see Glennon,
supra note 18, at 340-44. See also Judith Welch Wegner, Variations on a Theme-The
Concept of Equal Educational Opportunity and Programming Decisions Under the
Education forAll Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169,
195 (1985) (weight ofjudicial authority adopts broad inclusionary approach for defining
educational needs); id. at 198-205 (discussing cases using inclusionary and exclusionary
educational needs definition and arguing for inclusionary approach); Streett, supra note
7, at 46 ("the concept 'educational benefit' embraces more than academic subjects");
Hannon, supra note 17, at 731-32 (noting that in cases where children need more than
academic training, courts shift "their focus from academic progress to social and
emotional fulfillment and the attainment of basic skills necessary to live. The courts'
goals appear to be children's self-sufficiency.. . .") (footnote omitted).
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In summary, a child has a disability that adversely affects educational
performance if it affects any area of performance in which the state curriculum
requires instruction. Accordingly, a disability that adversely affects academic
performance is qualifying (assuming the child needs special education) because
all states require the teaching of academics. The same is true for disabilities with
physical effects, because all states require the teaching of physical education, at
least for certain grades. 62 States also include communication in their curricula,
meaning that a child's inability to communicate adversely affects educational
performance even if the child performs well academically. 61 Many states
include interpersonal relationships, emotional health, manners and other non-
academic performance areas in their curricula."6 The recent emergence of
162. See, e.g., Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369, 1371 (8th Cir. 1996)
(discussed infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text). The school district's argument
was that the child's orthopedic disability did not adversely affect her educational
performance as the curriculum no longer required her to take physical education. Id.
163. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11 5C-8 I (al) (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1-
402.6(l)(a) (2000). Many decision-makers reach the same conclusion, but without
referring to the state curriculum. See, e.g., Mary P. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 919 F.
Supp. 1173, 1180-81 (N.D. I11. 1996), amended by 934 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Il. 1996) ("a
child whom experts determine suffers from a speech impairment so severe as to inhibit
his ability or desire to communicate with his teachers and peers [but performs well
academically] meets the criteria of 'speech impairment' which 'adversely affects the
child's educational performance' ... and, thus, is a 'child with a disability'); Letter to
Lybarger, 16 EHLR 82, 85 (OSEP 1989) ("it is the position of the Office of Special
Education Programs that a child with a speech impairment that does not affect his/her
academic achievement can still be identified as an eligible 'handicapped child' under
EHA-B"); Weymouth Pub. Sch., 21 IDELR 578,580 (Mass. SEA 1994) ("Were Daniel
W. unable to communicate effectively because of the lisp, his satisfactory academic
progress would not bar his entitlement to special education under the analysis above and
the outcome of this case would be quite different.").
164. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6B-2(h) (2001) (schools must instruct students to
"develop[] ... the following character traits: ... respect for others, .. . cooperation,
... self control, . . . punctuality"); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52015(a)(3) (West 1989) (must
provide instruction that will enable students to "[d]evelop knowledge and skills in...
physical, emotional, and mental health"); FLA. STAT. ch. 1003.42(2)(f), (in) (1998)
(instructors shall teach "what it means to be a responsible and respectful person" and
"emotional health"); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-23.2 (West 1998) (requiring state
to develop a "model curriculum for reduction of self-destructive behavior"); id. at 23.4
("districts shall provide instruction in ... [t]he consequences of violent behavior"); IND.
CODE ANN. § 20-10.1-4-4 (Michie 2000) (requiring teacher to "present his instruction
with special emphasis on honesty, morality, courtesy, obedience to law"); id. § 20-10.1-4-
4.5(b) (requiring "instruction that stresses the nature and importance of the following:
... [r]especting authority... [t]reating others the way one would want to be treated
... [r]especting one's parents and home"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 279.50(1) (West 2003)
(schools "shall provide instruction in . . . self-esteem.. . interpersonal relationships");
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character education in state curricula leads to unprecedented breadth of what
children are taught in schools."" For good or ill, many public schools today
educate students in more than just academics. If they do, they must consider all
those areas "educational performance" when classifying disabled children. The
dramatic expansion of instruction areas cannot justify excluding these curricular
components from a child's educational performance when considering eligibility.
b. Areas of Performance Tracked by States' Schools
The curriculum, however, is not the only state standard that brings meaning
to the term "educational performance." The areas of performance that states
require schools to track, such as attendance and behavior, must also be included
within educational performance. Educators recognize that schools employ more
than just the formal curriculum to teach students, and identify five parts to the
teaching that occurs in schools:
[T]he official curriculum, the operational curriculum (the curriculum
as it is implemented by teachers), the hidden curriculum (the unstated
norms and values communicated to students in school), the null
curriculum (what is not taught), and the extra curriculum (planned
experiences outside of school subjects, such as sports teams). 66
While ascertaining the formal curriculum is a simple process, as it is a
written expression of what students should know,6 7 the teacher-specific and
id. § 256.11(l)-(2) (accrediting standards require that pre-kindergartners be taught "to
work and play with others, to express themselves ... [and] to develop healthy emotional
and social habits"); id. § 256.11(5)0) (must instruct high school students in "family life
.. emotional and social health"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:282.2(B) (West 2001)
(permitting schools to instruct in "the development of character traits such as honesty,
fairness, and respect for self and others"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § I (West
1996) ("[S]chools ...shall give instruction and training in ...good behavior.
Instruction in health education shall include.., emotional development."); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-81(el)(1) (1999) (children must be instructed in "'family life education'
. .. [m]ental and emotional health... [f]amilyliving"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 18.019(2)(b)
(West 1999) (permitting instruction in "interpersonal relationships"); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 28A.230.020 (West 1997) ("All teachers shall stress the importance of the
cultivation of manners ...."). Compare UTAH ADMIN. CODE R277-700-3-6 (2004)
(providing mainly an academic centered core curriculum).
165. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6B-2(h) (2001) (enumerating twenty-five character
traits to be taught); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-154.01 (B) (West 2002) (enumerating
seventeen character qualities that schools may include in their "character education").
166. O'Brien, supra note 139, at 149-50 (footnotes omitted).
167. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,240 (1990) (defining
a school's curriculum as "well within the competence of trial courts").
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subjective nature of the remaining instruction prevents discerning which areas
of that instruction the state expects its students to perform. After all, a teacher
may provide a religious slant to the curriculum (the operational curriculum) or
encourage students to "stop and smell the roses" (the hidden curriculum), but no
state would consider this to be educational performance expected of its students.
Yet when a state requires that an area of performance be formally tracked, this
subjectivity dissolves and a clear picture of what the state considers to be
educational performance emerges. Thus, while attendance, tardiness and
behavior may not be mentioned in the curriculum, the formal tracking of these
performance areas shows that they are educational performance a state expects
of its students.
Referring to areas of performance tracked by schools to define educational
performance is supported by IDEA. The goals in an IEP-the driving force of
an IEP-must be related to enabling the child to progress in the regular
curriculum and to "meeting each of the child's other educational needs that result
from the child's disability."'"" As a result, many IEPs include non-curricular
goals.'69 By identifying non-curricular yet educational needs, IDEA recognizes
that children with such needs are eligible. The regulations support this
conclusion by recognizing "that some children have other educational needs
resulting from their disability that also must be met, even though those needs are
not directly linked to participation in the general curriculum."' 7 These extra-
curricular yet educational needs are best identified as the areas of performance
formally tracked by schools and required by states, as these are undoubtedly of
concern to the educators. Accordingly, if attendance and behavior are not
specifically addressed in the curriculum, they must still be considered
educational performance as virtually all schools track and rate these performance
areas.1
7 1
168. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(ii)(II) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(2)(i)-(ii)
(2003).
169. Schoenfeld v. Parkway Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 379, 382 n.2 (8th Cir. 1998)
(noting in dicta that "[a]cademic achievement is not the only measure of the
appropriateness of a child's education"); In re Janie H., 507 EHLR 375, 377 (Ga. SEA
1986) ("education has not been limited to academic matters"); Glennon, supra note 18,
at 301 (stating that "many IEPs include more than academic goals shared by all students.
Many students with disabilities have learning goals relevant to their disability," and
providing examples.); id. at 342 ("behavioral, social, and emotional skills are an
appropriate focus of a special education program for an 'emotionally conflicted' child");
Huefner, supra note 7, at 516 n.53 (some eligible children are mainstreamed into the
regular education classroom to learn appropriate social behavior and not academics); id.
at 497 ("Instruction in such social and behavioral skills is appropriately considered
'educational."').
170. 34 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A, at 102 (2003).
171. All states have required attendance at school since 1918. Jonathan B.
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With respect to attendance, it is "self-evident that the inability to be present
in a classroom adversely affects one's educational performance." '72 An inability
to attend school closes the "door of public education"'73 and must be considered
educational performance to ensure "meaningful access to education."'
' 74
Attendance, standing alone, is important educational performance because it
provides a learning experience separate and apart from the teacher's instruction.
The mainstreaming requirements of IDEA drive this point home.",5 IDEA
strongly prefers that eligible children perform in the public school classroom
rather than restrictive settings such as residential placements or resource
classrooms because children learn more than academics in the classroom. 76 It
is for this reason that "services that enable a disabled child to remain in [the
public school classroom] during the day" are required for eligible children. 77
Because attendance itself leads to learning, it is educational performance for
Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and Secondary Education Enter the
"Adapt or Die "Environment of a Competitive Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHALLL. REV. 75,
85 (1995); see, e.g., KY. STAT. ANN. § 158.6451(c) (Michie 2000) ("Schools shall
increase their students' rates of attendance."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-209 (1996) ("All
school districts shall have a written policy on excessive absenteeism."); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 16-2-16 (2001) (requiring schools to have "rules and regulations for the attendance and
classification of the pupils ... and discipline of the public schools"); see also KATHLEEN
P. BENNETT & MARGARET D. LECOMPTE, THE WAY SCHOOLS WORK: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION 190 (Naomi Silverman & Judith Harlan eds., 1990) ("Schools
require that students be punctual .... Absenteeism is frowned upon and generally noted
on evaluations.").
172. In re Burton Valley Sch. Dist., 504 EHLR 256, 258 (1982) (finding that a
child performing well academically but whose behavior prevented consistent class
attendance fulfilled adverse effect element); see also Streett, supra note 7, at 44 ("ADHD
adversely affects daily school performance if the child cannot attend to his work and
remain in class or in school."); Shum, supra note 17, at 243 (an inability to attend school
is an adverse effect on educational performance).
173. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982).
174. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891 (1984); see also Rowley,
458 U.S. at 192.
175. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2000).
176. See, e.g., Hannon, supra note 17, at 743 ("The rationale underlying the [LRE]
requirement echoes the overall goal of self-sufficiency: the concern that children receive
the most normal education possible ... in the least restrictive setting ... to adapt to the
world beyond the educational environment and... to allow the nonhandicapped to adapt
to them.") (quotation marks omitted).
177. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel. Charlene F., 526 U.S. 66,
73 (1999); see id. at 76 (The district must "provide the services that Garret needs to stay
in school."); id. at 79 ("This case is about whether meaningful access to the public
schools will be assured .... It is undisputed that the services at issue must be provided
if Garret is to remain in school."); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 894
(1984) (if service needed to stay in school all day then it is a necessary aspect of the IEP).
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eligibility purposes even if decreased attendance does not lead to poor grades.'
In practical terms, disabilities that lead to hospitalization, behavior problems that
lead to exclusion from the classroom, and decreased mobility that leads to
tardiness all adversely affect educational performance and should be qualifying
if special education is needed.
In-school behavior should be similarly treated. Considering that the
Supreme Court repeatedly finds that public education "must inculcate the habits
and manners of civility as values in themselves,"' 79 it is no surprise that the Court
stated in dicta that a child's "very inability to conform his conduct to socially
acceptable norms . . . renders him 'handicapped' within the meaning of
[IDEA]."'8  More important than the Supreme Court's admonition that
discipline and behavior should be taught by schools, however, is the fact that
178. See, e.g., Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 150 (2d Cir. 2002) (A child
with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and fibromyalgia that performed well in school was
found eligible because she had a disability that "made it impossible for her to attend
school. As a result of her inability to attend classes, she required 'special education' in
the form of home instruction."); Corchado ex rel. Corchado v. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp.
2d 168, 173 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (child's seizure disorder adversely affected his educational
performance because it caused him to "miss many days of school, both as a result of the
seizures themselves and so that he could attend medical appointments"); Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 29 IDELR 690 (Ala. SEA 1998) (child's asthma did not adversely
affect her educational performance because it did not affect her attendance and she
performed well academically); Sierra Sands Unified Sch. Dist., 30 IDELR 306 (Cal. SEA
1998) (depression that prevented child from attending school adversely affected
educational performance); Bd. of Educ., 34 IDELR 216 (N.Y. SEA 2000) (child
performing well academicallybut who had disability leading to decreased attendance was
IDEA eligible).
179. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); see also New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (noting the "substantial interest of teachers
and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds");
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 592-93 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Education in any
meaningful sense includes the inculcation of an understanding in each pupil of the
necessity of rules and obedience thereto. This understanding is no less important than
learning to read and write. One who does not comprehend the meaning and necessity of
discipline is handicapped not merely in his education but throughout his subsequent life.
... The lesson of discipline is not merely a matter of the student's self-interest in the
shaping of his own character and personality; it provides an early understanding of the
relevance to the social compact of respect for the rights of others. The classroom is the
laboratory in which this lesson of life is best learned."); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (the Court has "repeatedly emphasized...
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials ... to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools").
180. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 (1988).
[Vol. 69
38
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/3
2004] INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATIONACT 479
schools also consider behavior part of educational performance by monitoring,
tracking and often grading it.'
8
'
However, the poor behavior must occur in-school, as out-of-school
behaviors such as those relating to parent/child relationships are typically not
tracked by schools and not covered in the curriculum.' OSEP agrees, but on
the ground that IDEA's "provisions and requirements relate to the educational
environment.... [Therefore] for eligibility purposes, the student must meet the
["adversely affects" prong] within the educational environment . ,, ." The
only exception should be when the out-of-school behavior affects an area of
educational performance, such as completing homework or attending school.
In summary, a child's good grades and test scores should not preclude the
child from IDEA eligibility so long as the student's disability adversely affects
an area of performance identified in the state curriculum or tracked by the state's
schools. This definition ensures state primacy in education while fulfilling the
dual purposes of IDEA.
IDEA's equality purpose rings hollow if only academic performance counts
for children seeking eligibility while the state considers non-academic
performance to be important for all students. Defining educational performance
with respect to the entire curriculum and areas of performance formally tracked
by the school ensures that areas of performance are treated uniformly for
disabled and non-disabled students alike. If attendance and good behavior are
expected of general education students, equality demands that attendance and
181. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 26 (calling for eligibility
"assessments that reflect learning and behavior in the classroom"); Glennon, supra note
18, at 325-32 (arguing that schools over-emphasize discipline and behavior control to the
detriment of emotionally disturbed children).
182. But see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 256.11(5)0) (West 2003) (schools must
instruct high school students in "family life.., emotional and social health"); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-81 (el)(1) (1999) (children must be instructed in "'family life education'
... [m]ental and emotional health ... [f]amily living").
183. Letter to Anonymous, 213 EHLR 247, 249 (OSEP 1989); see also Katherine
S. v. Umbach, No. CIV.A. 00-T-982-E, 2002 WL 226697, at *12 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 1,
2002) ("[lIt is key that none of the evidence, especially including reports and testimony
from the experts who evaluated Katherine, supports a finding that her emotional
difficulties caused her to be disabled in an educational context or in need of special
education or related services." Rather, her problems existed only at home.); Old Orchard
Beach Sch. Dep't, 21 IDELR 1084 (Me. SEA 1994) ("Because a parent has difficulty
controlling her child does not qualify the child for special education.... If the parents
are unable to help her with time management and decision making because of the family
dynamics, they need to contact the community mental health agency that provides
services. This is not a responsibility of the school."); Fauquier County Pub. Sch., 20
IDELR 579 (Va. SEA 1993) (child's at-home behavior problems did not adversely affect
educational performance); Callegary, supra note 25, at 186 (emotional disturbance must
exist in school environment to fulfill "adversely affects" prong).
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good behavior qualify as educational performance for IDEA eligibility purposes.
States expressly defining educational performance differently for disabled
students than regular education students violate IDEA because they improperly
exclude children that would otherwise be eligible.'84
IDEA's goal of self-sufficiency is also best served by referring to the state
curriculum and areas of performance tracked by states. States and localities, the
experts in education, are best suited to identify which areas of performance are
important for their students to attain self-sufficiency. Furthermore, including the
areas of performance tracked and taught, but not graded, is justified because
more than academic instruction is required for a child to achieve self-
sufficiency. 8 ' A child that performs well academically but cannot control
behavior will not be prepared for independence and self-sufficiency upon
graduation.
Finally, a curriculum and tracking centered definition of educational
performance protects the individualized nature of eligibility determinations.
Because schools track and grade more areas of performance for primary school
students than junior high and high school students, younger students will have
more qualifying disabilities. 8 This is consistent with IDEA, which expressly
allows states to ignore the enumerated disabilities and the "adversely affects"
requirement, and therefore expands eligibility for younger students.1
8 7
184. The only limitation on a state's eligibility criteria is that it may not "operate
to exclude any students who, in the absence of the State's criteria, would be eligible for
services under [IDEA]." Letter to Pawlisch, 24 IDELR 959, 964 (OSEP 1995).
Accordingly, the critical question left unanswered in J.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet School
District, 224 F.3d 60,66 (2d Cir. 2000), discussed supra notes 134-37 and accompanying
text, is whether Vermont's definition of educational performance for eligibility purposes
operates to exclude otherwise eligible children. The definition should be stricken if it
defines educational performance for disabled students more restrictively than the state
educational standards define educational performance for regular education children.
185. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 47 ("academic achievement alone
will not lead to successful results for students with disabilities"); Glennon, supra note 18,
at 356 ("[E]ducational performance [should] include ... other school-related skills,
including behavioral, social, and emotional skills. These skills are related to success for
children in future schooling and work situations."); Ketterman, supra note 4, at 935 ("An
emotional disability that adversely affects a child's well-being and relationships with
others must be considered as an adverse affect upon the educational goal of creating
productive members of society.").
186. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 256.11 (West 2003) (Iowa curriculum identifies
different areas of instruction for different grades).
187. IDEA allows states to find children ages three through nine eligible based on
"developmental delays.., in one or more of the following areas: physical development,
cognitive development, communication development, social or emotional development,
or adaptive development." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B)(i) (2000).
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With the scope of educational performance delineated, the difficult issue
becomes whether the educational performance is adversely affected by the
disability or other factors, like lack of motivation, care or willingness. There are
countless reasons for children not doing their homework, but only those reasons
that directly result from an enumerated disability lead to eligibility. Eligibility
is often denied because factors other than the disability cause the adverse effect
on educational performance.'88 The higher eligibility hurdle than causation,
though, is the "needs special education" requirement, as many of these
educational problems can be addressed by non-special education services or
simply do not lower a child's performance enough to require attention. Before
addressing the need requirement, though, the meaning of "adversely affects"
must be explored.
B. "Adversely Affects"
With the meaning of educational performance in-hand, the "adversely
affects" language is easily understood. States, of course, are free to define the
term. In states that do not define the term, decision-makers consistently stumble
over two obstacles in its application. The first is whether adverse effect is
determined with or without the non-special education services already provided
the child. As explained below, "special education" is a term of art specifically
defined by IDEA. Many disabled children receive non-special education
services to address their disabilities, usually under Section 504.189 If the child
performs well with these services, is educational performance "adversely
affected" by the disability? The second obstacle is determining how adverse the
effect must be for the disability to qualify.
188. See, e.g., Houston County Pub. Sch. Sys., 35 IDELR 25 (Ala. SEA 2001)
(poor school performance was a result of failure to attend school and complete
assignments therefore ADD did not adversely affect educational performance); Mt.
Diablo Unified Sch. Dist., 26 IDELR 338 (Cal. SEA 1997) (child's poor educational
performance was a result of drug use and truancy, not emotional disturbance, therefore
"adversely affects" requirements unfulfilled); Glendale Unified Sch. Dist., 509 EHLR
203, 205 (Cal. SEA 1987) (when child lost speaking ability for six months due to the
parents' failure to send her to therapy and her placement in a setting without
communication, the hearing officer found the "adversely affects" prong unmet because
"Petitioner failed to establish that her possible partial cessation of speech was caused by
her [disability]"); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(10)(ii) (2003) (learning disability does
not include learning problems that are the result of environmental, cultural or economic
disadvantage).
189. See infra notes 214-26 and accompanying text (discussing definition of
special education and differences between Section 504 and IDEA).
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The first issue is illustrated by the disagreement between the Eighth Circuit
majority and dissent in Yankton School District v. Schramm.9 ° The majority
found that the child's orthopedic impairment adversely affected her educational
performance because, "but for the specialized instruction and services provided
by the school district, Tracy's ability to learn and do the required class work
would be adversely affected by her cerebral palsy."' 9 The majority essentially
asked what would the child's educational performance be "but for" the services
currently provided to determine adverse effect.' 92 The dissent disagreed:
The majority assumes that, were the school district to deny Ms.
Schramm every reasonable accommodation to her disability, her
academic performance would be adversely affected by her impairment.
... Because Ms. Schramm will continue to receive these reasonable
accommodations [under Section 504] regardless of her status under the
IDEA, I perceive no reason to disregard their existence and to
speculate on what impact Ms. Schramm's impairments could have on
her academic performance without them.'93
Put simply, the dissent concludes that if a child performs well with non-special
education services then the child's disability does not adversely affect
educational performance. The dissent is not alone in reaching this conclusion. 94
190. 93 F.3d 1369, 1374 (8th Cir. 1996).
191. Id. at 1375.
192. For other courts employing the "but for" analysis, see Weixel v. Bd. of Educ.,
287 F.3d 138, 150 (2d Cir. 2002); Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., No. CIV. 02-136-JD,
2003 WL 1343023, at *8 (D.N.H. Mar. 19, 2003) (the "adversely affects" requirement
is satisfied if the child's "educational performance would have been adversely affected
... but for the specialized instruction she was receiving"); and Bristol Township Sch.
Dist., 28 IDELR 330, 335 (Pa. SEA 1998) ("[B]ut for the specially designed instruction
and services provided by Christina's special education trained mother during Christina's
third and fourth grade years at I.C., Christina's ability to physically function and/or to
learn and do the required classwork would have been so adversely affected by her
disability and all the unique needs attendant thereto, that she would never have made the
educational progress the District so boldly asserts.").
193. Yankton, 93 F.3d at 1378 n.2 (Magill, J., dissenting).
194. See also St. Clair County Bd. of Educ., 29 IDELR 688 (Ala. SEA 1998)
(orthopedic impairment did not adversely affect child's educational performance because
child performed well with non-special education services); Smithtown Cent. Sch. Dist.,
29 IDELR 293,300 (N.Y. SEA 1998) ("Petitioner argues that respondent can not provide
services to a child with a disability to insure that the child is receiving an appropriate
education, then subsequently determine that the disability does not adversely impact the
child's education. I find that petitioner's argument is overstated. School districts can,
and indeed are required to, provide supplementary services to children before referring
them to the CSE."); Bd. of Educ., 21 IDELR 1024, 1028, 1033 (N.Y. SEA 1994)
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It stretches logic to find that a disability does not affect educational
performance merely because the services necessitated by the disability lead to
adequate educational performance. To receive Section 504 services, the child's
impairment must limit one or more major life activities, here education.19 5 The
fact that a disabled child requires services at all-even if only non-special
education services under Section 504--confirms that the disability adversely
impacts the child's educational performance.
The Yankton dissent's logic is appealing, as it denies IDEA eligibility to
children already performing well without it. Yet the "needs special education"
prong accomplishes the same purpose more appropriately. As argued below, if
a child performs well with non-special education services then the child does not
need special education and should not be IDEA eligible. 196 It is suitable to
consider a child's success with services in ascertaining need rather than in
deciding if there is an adverse effect and existence of qualifying disability in the
first instance.' 97 Imagine explaining to parents, whose child has a medically
diagnosed disability and receives Section 504 services, that their child does not
have a disability under IDEA. A more palatable explanation, and the one
required by IDEA, is that a child who performs well with non-special education
services has a qualifying disability but is not eligible because special education
is unnecessary.
Similar grounds resolve the second issue troubling decision-makers-how
adverse must the effect be for the disability to qualify. In Yankton the Eighth
Circuit found the "adversely affects" requirement fulfilled because the
orthopedic impairment resulted in "difficulty taking notes or completing her
assignments" and the child "would be late to class and unable to take her
books."'9 " It did not find that the orthopedic impairment would result in
academic failure if not addressed, but rather that her orthopedic impairment
(hearing officer found that child's ADD did not adversely affect his educational
performance because he was successful in the regular education program with "high level
of teacher direction" and "additional or individual instruction on a regular basis");
George W. Indep. Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 287, 290 (Tex. SEA 2001) (because child is
"successful in the regular mainstream classroom with the assistance of the amplification
device already being provided to her by the school district... her hearing impairment
does not adversely affect her educational performance").
195. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 104.30) (2003). For an up-to-date
discussion of the Section 504 eligibility standards, see Perry A. Zirkel, Conducting
Legally Defensible § 504/ADA Eligibility Determinations, 176 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1
(2003).
196. See infra notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
197. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c) (2003) (a child does not have a qualifying disability
unless it adversely affects educational performance).
198. Yankton, 93 F.3d at 1375.
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would affect the child's "academic success" if not addressed. 99 In Muller v.
Committee on Special Education, the Second Circuit found the "adversely
affects" prong satisfied because the child's "performance improved in settings
in which her emotional problems were being addressed."20 0 InMaryP. v. Illinois
State Board of Education, a federal district court held that a child's mild speech
impairment which would "inhibit his ability or desire to communicate with his
teachers and peers meets the criteria of 'speech impairment' which 'adversely
affects the child's educational performance.""'20 These courts find that a child
with satisfactory performance may still have a disability that adversely affects
educational performance because it "inhibits" performance, creates "difficulty"
with performance or merely because the child's performance could be
"improved."
Many decision-makers disagree, requiring that the disability significantly
affect performance to qualify.20 2 In Doe ex rel. Doe v. Board of Education of
State of Connecticut the child was depressed, violent, refused to go to school and
was hospitalized.20 3 The court found the child ineligible because his education
199. Id. ("Tracy's academic success has depended upon these special measures.
200. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ., 145 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 1998).
201. Mary P. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 919 F. Supp. 1173, 1180 (N.D. I1. 1996),
amended by 934 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
202. See, e.g., Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., No. CIV. 02-136-JD, 2003 WL
1343023, at *8 (D.N.H. Mar. 19, 2003) (without special education child would have
performed below average in most subjects and failed others, therefore disability adversely
affected educational performance); Los Alamitos Unified Sch. Dist., 26 IDELR 1053,
1060, 1063 (Cal. SEA 1997) ("STUDENT'S educational performance was not so
adversely affected by the [ADD] as to demonstrate a need for special education." The
ADD did not limit the child "such that her educational performance was adversely
affected in a significant way.") (emphasis added); In re Hollister Sch. Dist., 26 IDELR
632, 660 (Cal. SEA 1997) (serious emotional disturbance did not adversely affect
educational performance because the child "has always been mainstreamed in regular
education classes and has consistently received better than passing grades"); Bristol
Township Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 330,335 (Pa. SEA 1998) ("but for the specially designed
instruction and services provided by Christina's special education trained mother during
Christina's third and fourth grade years at I.C., Christina's ability to physically function
and/or to learn and do the required classwork would have been so adversely affected by
her disability and all the unique needs attendant thereto, that she would never have made
the educational progress the District so boldly asserts") (emphasis added); Fauquier
County Pub. Sch., 20 IDELR 579, 583 (Va. SEA 1993) (disability has no adverse effect
because "Child has made effective progress in school, including math where [child]
experienced past difficulty, is well adjusted there, can effectively perform educational
tasks in an independent fashion, follows class rules, substantially maintains control and
does not disrupt the class").
203. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 753 F. Supp. 65, 66-67, 69-70 (D. Conn.
1990); see supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (discussing how court mistakenly
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was not "significantly impeded" as shown by his satisfactory educational
performance before, during, and after his hospitalization.1 4 The court in
GregoryM. ex rel. Ernest M v. State Board ofEducation ofState of Connecticut
went further, finding the "adversely affects" prong unsatisfied even though the
child received Cs and Ds.2 °s It held that the child's "education was not
significantly impeded or adversely affected by his behavioral difficulties.""2 6
Even when the child laterbecame "'oppositional, disruptive and distractible" 2 7
and his "marks deteriorated" ' 8 the court found no adverse effect because "he
still achieved within the national average range on [standardized tests] ... [and
made] significant progress."0 9 The court in essence concluded that the disability
did not adversely affect educational performance despite it resulting in low
grades and average standardized test scores.
2 1 0
Requiring that performance be "significantly impeded" to fulfill the adverse
effect prong improperly excludes children otherwise eligible under IDEA
because the plain meaning of "adversely affects" is any effect. The lack of a
qualifier in the term, such as "substantially affects" or "significantly impedes,"
suggests that any negative impact on educational performance, no matter how
adverse, suffices for eligibility. Decision-makers adding a qualifier to adverse
effect are engaging in inappropriate judicial lawmaking, which the Supreme
Court always abhors, but particularly when interpreting IDEA.2 '
limited educational performance to strictly academics).
204. Doe, 753 F. Supp. at 70.
205. Gregory M. ex rel. Ernest M. v. State Bd. of Educ., 891 F. Supp. 695, 697-98
(D. Conn. 1995).
206. Id. at 702.
207. Id. at 698.
208. Id. at 702.
209. Id.
210. See also Trumann Pub. Sch., 18 IDELR 790 (Ark. SEA 1992) (child's speech
impairment did not adversely affect his educational performance despite receiving a
"needs improvement" grade in articulation).
211. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel. Charlene F., 526
U.S. 66, 77 (1999) (refusing to accept "the District's cost-based standard [for the
provision of medical services under IDEA]" because it "would require us to engage in
judicial lawmaking without any guidance from Congress"); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,
323, 325 (1988) ("[W]e decline petitioner's invitation to rewrite the [IDEA]" to add a
dangerousness exception to IDEA's "stay-put" provisions because "we are . . . not at
liberty to engraft onto the statute an exception Congress chose not to create" and the Act
simply "means what it says."); see also Champagne, supra note 33, at 589 ("more
complex legal reasoning about the intent of the statute, and more common-sense based
arguments about the needs associated with managing the educational process, fell before
the simple wording of the statute"); Whitted, supra note 77, at 549, 553 ("The Supreme
Court is quite literal in [interpreting IDEA] and will not insert meanings that were never
present.").
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Requiring a significant effect on educational performance before eligibility
attaches is understandable because of the fear of opening the eligibility
floodgates to children whose disability only minimally affects their performance.
But the need requirement is the proper analytical tool to close these floodgates,
as the term "need" compels ascertaining the child's current performance level.212
The term "adversely affects," on the other hand, plainly means that any effect
suffices irrespective of the child's current performance level.
States can certainly interpret the adverse effect element as requiring a low
level of performance. In New York, for example, a child's condition must
adversely impact the child's performance to the extent that he or she requires
special education or related services.2t3 As the New York standard essentially
acknowledges, though, the "needs special education" prong is the more
appropriate limitation on eligibility when the concern is the severity of the
problem, just as it is when considering a child's success with non-disabled
services.
In conclusion, a disability "adversely affects the child's educational
performance" when an enumerated disability, and not other factors, has any
effect, no matter how slight, on any area of instruction mandated in the state
curriculum or any area of performance formally tracked by the state's schools.
IV. "NEEDS SPECIAL EDUCATION"
A. "Special Education"
The above discussion emphasizes the importance of the "needs special
education" limitation on IDEA eligibility.2" 4 Indeed, the need for "special
education" is the critical distinction between eligibility under Section 504 and
IDEA .2' "Special education" is a term of art, with a limited meaning, and not
212. See infra Part IV.B.
213. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.1(mm) (2003). For application
of this unified standard, see Corchado ex rel. Corchado v. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp. 2d
168, 171 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (The 'crux of the issue' [was] whether [the child's]
'educational performance was adversely affected by his difficulties to an extent
warranting special education."'); Rochester City Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR 178, 184 (N.Y.
SEA 1999) ("a child must not only have a specific physical or mental condition, but such
condition must adversely impact upon the child's performance to the extent that he or she
requires special education and/or related services"); and Smithtown Cent. Sch. Dist., 29
IDELR 293, 299 (N.Y. SEA 1998).
214. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(1) (2003).
215. If a child onlyneeds related services, usuallyprovided under Section 504, and
not "special education" then the child is not eligible. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(2)(i) (2003);
see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 20, at 93 (explaining that child must need special
education under IDEA but not under Section 504); WEBER, supra note 28, § 2.2(1)
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all services provided by schools to disabled students are special education.2"6 A
child with Attention Deficit Disorder ("ADD") may need preferential seating and
the use of a word processor, but not special education." 7 A child with a physical
impairment may need mobility assistance to get around school, but not special
education." 8 A speech-impaired child may need speech pathology services, but
not special education. 1 9 Section 504's coverage is broader than IDEA's because
it does not consider the child's need for special education.2 0 Children eligible
under Section 504 still seek IDEA eligibility, though, because IDEA specifies
more services and procedural safeguards. 2' As a result, the definition of special
education is often determinative of IDEA eligibility.
For example, in Yankton School District v. Schramm, a child with cerebral
palsy required adaptive physical education, physical therapy, transportation to
and from school, shortened writing assignments, copies of the teachers' class
notes, a computer for taking notes, separate sets of books for school and home,
("Nevertheless, some children with physical limitations or other conditions have no
unique needs that call for special instruction, but cannot receive an equal education
without services that IDEA classes as related services. If such a child meets the
definition of an individual with handicaps found in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
school district must provide the services to the child."); McClendon, supra note 16, at 92.
216. See supra note 10.
217. Norton v. Orinda Union Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished
table opinion) (a child with ADD requiring preferential seating, use of word processor
and handwriting assistance was not IDEA eligible because those services were not special
education).
218. WEBER, supra note 28, § 8.1 n.4 ("The most commonly discussed examples
of children who are disabled for purposes of Section 504 but not IDEA are ... students
with physical disabilities or health impairments who require no special education as that
term is defined in state and federal law."); see also Letter to Pawlisch, 24 IDELR 959,
960 (OSEP 1995) (The inquirer noted that "[n]ot every child with an impairment defined
under Part B needs special education as a result such impairment. This is most simply
illustrated by reference to a child with a severe physical impairment who needs no
modification to the regular education program by reason of that impairment.").
219. Weymouth Pub. Sch., 21 IDELR 578 (Mass. SEA 1994) (lisp had adverse
effect on child's educational performance but child was not IDEA eligible because he did
not need special education).
220. Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 900 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (D.S.D. 1995),
affrd, 93 F.3d 1369 (8th Cir. 1996); Letter to Teague, 20 IDELR 1462, 1463 (OSEP
1994); Brittan (CA) Elementary Sch. Dist., 16 EHLR 1226, 1228 (OCR 1990); WEBER,
supra note 28, § 8.1; Daniel & Coriell, supra note 20, at 575; Guernsey, supra note 13,
at 564,566 ("Section 504 is broad and general in coverage, while EAHCA is narrow and
specific."); Stafford, supra note 12, at 80 (Section 504 is "broader in scope" than IDEA);
Wegner, supra note 12, at 395-404.
221. Some scholars assert that the free appropriate public education under Section
504 requires a higher level of educational benefit than IDEA, but no court has so held.
See Guernsey, supra note 13, at 591.
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and instruction on how to type with one hand.222 With these services, the child
received almost straight As and participated in numerous extracurricular
activities.223 The Eighth Circuit did not address whether the successful child in
fact "needed" special education.224 Rather, the issue was "whether those services
constitute 'special education and related services' under the IDEA," which the
court answered affirmatively.225 Many eligibility decisions similarly hinge on
whether the services the child requires are in fact special education. 26
Regrettably, courts and hearing officers often fail to consider the special
education restriction, often presuming that if a child's disability adversely affects
educational performance then the child needs special education. The Second
222. Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369, 1371 (8th Cir. 1996).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1374 n.4.
225. Id. The dissent agreed, but concluded that the child was ineligible because
she was "achieving academic success without special education programs." Id. at 1377
(Magill, J., dissenting).
226. See, e.g., Del. County Intermediate Unit v. Jonathan S., 809 A.2d 1051, 1056
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (Child ineligible despite orthopedic impairment that had adverse
effect because "[t]he record.., is bereft of any evidence that Student's gross and fine
motor development delays require the adapting of content, methodology, or delivery of
instruction to address Student's unique needs. Because there is no evidence of record
that Student requires such specially designed instruction, he does not meet the controlling
definition of a child with a disability .. "); Old Orchard Beach Sch. Dep't, 21 IDELR
1084, 1090 (Me. SEA 1994) ("AG is now in a personalized program with a low
teacher/student ratio, lots of accountability, a case manager to communicate with home
on a regular basis and deal with social skills issues, and taking one course at the high
school by her choice. If she were labelled, nothing would change as this program is the
one described bythe psychologists to meet her needs and the program serves both special
education and regular education students."); Rochester City Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR 178,
185 (N.Y. SEA 1999) ("Though his IQ scores place him in the superior range of
intellectual functioning, and his academic performance is in the average range, it is not
clear that the child requires special education services. The child's health concerns
provide an explanation for his frequent absences, but there is little explanation in the
record for his failure to complete homework. These issues could be addressed without
the need for special education services."); Smithtown Cent. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 293,
300 (N.Y. SEA 1998) ("I am unable to determine whether these accommodations
employed by the child's teachers to address the boy's [disabilities] amounted to [special
education]" and therefore whether the child needs special education and is eligible.);
Wayne Highlands Sch. Dist., 24 IDELR 476, 477-78 (Pa. SEA 1996) ("The parents
contend that Laura is in need of specially designed instruction and assert that Laura has
been receivingjust such instruction .... The District counters that Laura simply requires
accommodations to her regular education program and that these accommodations do not
qualify as specially designed instruction .... Despite the parents' assertion to the
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Circuit's analysis in Muller ex rel. Muller v. Committee on Special Education,
East Islip Union Free School District227 is illustrative. In Muller a state review
officer and appeal panel determined that a child with depression and
Oppositional Defiant Disorder was not IDEA eligible under the "serious
emotional disturbance" classification because, among other things, there was no
evidence "that the child requires special education and/or related services to
benefit from instruction. ' 22 8 The Second Circuit disagreed, finding the child
IDEA eligible because "her emotional difficulties adversely affected her
educational development. '229 The court did not discuss the "needs special
education" requirement the hearing officer and review panel relied on to deny
eligibility, instead presuming that a disability that adversely affects educational
performance requires remediation through special education.23 A similar
presumption was made in Corchado ex rel. Corchado v. Board of Education,
Rochester City, School District.23 ' The hearing officer and state appeal officer
both found a child with seizure disorder, ADD, tremors, and speech and
language deficiencies ineligible under IDEA because he performed well
academically and therefore did not need special education.23 2  The court
reversed, and notwithstanding its statement that "not every child who has a
disability needs special education," still held that "denying him special education
benefits because he is able to pass from grade to grade despite documented
impairments that adversely affect his educational performance is wrong. '"233
Many other courts and hearing officers likewise assume that if a child's disability
227. 145 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1998).
228. Id. at 100 (quotation marks omitted). Interestingly, the Second Circuit did not
provide the administrative decisions with the deferential standard of review required by
Board of Education ofthe HendrickHudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 206 (1982), and 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(e)(2) because the issue was not about the
appropriateness of an educational plan, a factual matter best resolved by educators, but
rather a legal issue of eligibility. Muller, 145 F.3d at 102.
229. Muller, 145 F.3d at 103; see also id. at 104 n.6 ("The IHO's apparent belief
that Treena's emotional problems were unrelated to school is of little if any relevance,
so long as those problems had a significant effect on her ability to learn.").
230. The Second Circuit did not necessarily reach the wrong conclusion; it simply
employed an incomplete analysis. It may be that the child needed special education,
considering she needed "small group settings in which she could receive much needed
emotional support and individualized attention," id. at 99, but the court did not expressly
consider this eligibility requirement or finding by the lower review officers. This
omission is surprising considering the Second Circuit's opinion two years later in J.D.
ex rel. J.D. v. Pawlet School District, 224 F.3d 60,66-67 (2d Cir. 2000), where the court
treated the "adversely affects" prong and the "needs special education" prong
independently.
231. 86 F. Supp. 2d 168 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
232. Id. at 171-72, 176.
233. Id. at 176.
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adversely affects educational performance then the child needs special
education.1
3 1
This presumption fails because, as noted above, a child's disability may
often be appropriately served by something other than special education.235 The
emotionally disturbed child in Muller, for example, may have needed only the
unidentified accommodations the district offered in its Section 504 plan, and not
special education, to address her educational needs.236 The presumption also
fails because not every educational problem needs addressing. As discussed
below, a child that achieves a B+ in math instead of an A because of a disability
fulfills the "adversely affects" requirement but does not "need" special
education, even if special education would help.237 Determining that a child's
disability adversely affects educational performance simply does not answer the
question of whether the child needs special education.
In short, the "needs special education" and adverse effect requirements are
independent restrictions on eligibility. To be sure, these requirements are
intertwined. After all, to be eligible a child must need special education by
reason of, or on account of, an enumerated disability that adversely affects
educational performance.23 The union of "adversely affects" and "need" in one
234. See, e.g., In re Anthony F., 628 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(The court concluded that the child needed special education because he has "behavioral
problems that are attributable to his speech impairment .... and that, unless these
problems are addressed, they will continue to affect his learning abilities." While the
court noted in a different context that the experts testified that the child needed special
education, the court did not cite this testimony to support its conclusion that the child
needed special education.); Benjamin R., 508 EHLR 183, 185 (Mass. SEA 1986) (child
found IDEA eligible despite being "gifted... with very superior cognitive abilities" and
performing well socially and academically in kindergarten because "perceptual deficits
exist which impact on educational progress"); Phila. Sch. Dist., 27 IDELR 447 (Pa. SEA
1997) (without discussing the "need" requirement, the hearing officer found a gifted
child that received Ds in Spanish was IDEA eligible as learning disabled); George W.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 287, 290 (Tex. SEA 200 1) ("the legal issue is whether that
impairment adversely affects her educational performance and thus whether she 'needs'
special education and related services"); In re Kristopher H., 507 EHLR 183 (Wash. SEA
1985) (hearing officer did not consider the district's argument that the child did not need
special education, finding rather that the child was IDEA eligible because his disability
adversely affected his educational performance).
235. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text; see also Huefner, supra note
7, at 497 n.63.
236. Muller ex rel. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ., 145 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir.
1998). This, presumably, is why the hearing officer and state review panel found the
child did not need special education. Id. at 100-01.
237. See infra Part IV.B.2.
238. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii) (2000).
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sentence, however, does not mean a union of analysis. Both terms still act
independently to limit eligibility and still must be defined and applied.
Despite its importance to eligibility, this Article does not address the
nebulous definition of special education. The principal focus of this Article is
to identify the circumstances where children passing from grade to grade may
still be IDEA eligible. But the special education strand needs no unfurling to
answer this primary question, as it is the "adversely affects educational
performance" and "need" language that often preclude eligibility for such
children. I assume that special education would assist the child, and determine
instead when it is needed.
B. "Needs"
IDEA "contains no explicit guidelines for determining whether a student
with an impairment needs special education."239 Rather, like the "adversely
affects" prong, it is left to the states to give this term meaning.240 The only
limitation is that the state's criteria may not "operate to exclude any students
who, in the absence of the State's criteria, would be eligible for services" under
IDEA.241 Yet this is virtually impossible to determine as IDEA and its
regulations provide no clues whatsoever to the definition of "need." While the
IEP, assessment and free appropriate public education requirements of IDEA
helped identify the educational problems IDEA seeks to address, nothing in
those same provisions informs decision-makers as to what level the problems
must reach before a need for special education is found or whether the child's
level of performance is even considered in the need analysis.
The legislative history is similarly barren. The predecessor to the EAHCA
and IDEA was the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
("ESEA").242 The ESEA provided grants to states to meet the needs of
educationally disadvantaged children but did not identify or attempt to define
disabled children.2 43 The ESEA was amended in 1966 to specify programs
authorized for "handicapped children" and defined them as children with certain
enumerated disabilities "who by reason thereof require special education and
related services." 2" The legislative history gave no indication as to who requires
special education. The EAHCA adopted the "requires special education"
239. Letter to Pawlisch, 24 IDELR 959, 964 (OSEP 1995); see also J.D. ex rel. J.D.
v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2000).
240. Letter to Pawlisch, 24 IDELR at 963.
241. Id.
242. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
243. Id. § 601.
244. Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 602, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966).
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limitation without legislative comment.24 The language remained until the 1990
reauthorization of IDEA, which only changed "requires" to "needs," again
without legislative comment.'" Apart from the plain meaning of "need," the
language, structure and legislative history of IDEA simply do not help identify
the children Congress envisioned as needing special education.
Further, traditional canons of statutory construction, while always
problematic, are particularly dubious for defining "need" under IDEA. As
Professor Llewellyn pointed out long ago, opposing canons of statutory
construction apply to almost every question of interpretation that might be
posed.247 This problem is acute under IDEA. A broad definition including many
children is justified because "IDEA is remedial legislation" that should be
construed "broadly to effectuate its goals and purposes.""24 On the other hand,
a limited definition is justified because IDEA was enacted pursuant to
Congress's spending power and must be interpreted "narrowly, in order to avoid
saddling the States with obligations that they did not anticipate." '249 Traditional
canons of statutory construction lead no closer to the meaning of need than do
the language, structure and legislative history of IDEA. The result is that it is
virtually impossible for states to determineif their definition of need improperly
acts to exclude otherwise eligible children.
Not only is the meaning of need difficult to glean from IDEA itself, it is
difficult to determine which state standards should be referenced in defining
need. Some states simply define need in their regulations regarding disabled
children. For example, Massachusetts provides that there is a need for special
education when the child is "unable to progress effectively in a regular education
program."25 Colorado pronounces that a child only needs special education if
245. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 602(a), 89 Stat. 773, 775 (1975).
246. Pub. L. 101-476, § 101(a), 104 Stat. 1103, 1103 (1990).
247. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395,401-06
(1950).
248. Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 576 (4th Cir. 1997) (Mumaghan,
J., dissenting) ("Clearly, the IDEA is remedial legislation. A familiar canon of statutory
construction requires courts to interpret remedial legislation, such as the IDEA, broadly
to effectuate its goals and purposes.").
249. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel. Charlene F., 526 U.S. 66,
84 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
250. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B, § 1 (West 1996); MASS. REGS. CODE tit.
603, § 28.020) (2003). To "progress effectively" in regular education means:
[T]o make documented growth in the acquisition of knowledge and skills,
including social/emotional development, within the general education
program, with or without accummodations, according to chronological age
and developmental expectations, the individual educational potential of the
child, and the learning standards set forth in the Massachusetts Curriculum
[Vol. 69
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the child cannot receive "reasonable benefit from ordinary education.
25
'
Tennessee articulates that a child needs special education when the child is
unable "to be educated appropriately in the general education program. "252
The problem arises in states that do not define "need" just as it arose in
states that did not define "adversely affects educational performance." However,
Congress left no breadcrumb trail to the proper state standards to bring meaning
to the term as it did when pointing to the state curriculum for the meaning of
educational performance. Furthermore, incorporating state standards into the
definition of educational performance was straightforward, as a state's
curriculum and the areas of performance its schools track easily imparted
meaning to the term. No general state educational standards so obviously inform
decision-makers of when a child needs special education. 2 3 Even the states that
expressly define "need" beg the question of when a child is "progressing
effectively," being "educated appropriately" or receiving "reasonable benefit"
in regular education.
With almost no guidance from IDEA and no apparent general state
educational standards to bring meaning to the term "need," it is no surprise there
is sharp disagreement among decision-makers. There are two essential points of
debate. The first is whether the child's need for special education can be
ascertained without considering the child's current level of educational
performance. Put another way, should a child be deemed to need special
education merely because the child can benefit from it? The second issue is if
current educational performance levels are to be considered in ascertaining a
need for special education, under what level must a child's performance fall for
eligibility.
1. The Benefit Standard
Many decision-makers, without any justification from state standards,
improperly find that a child needs special education merely because the child can
benefit from it. They eliminate the child's current educational performance level
from the equation and find that eligibility attaches if special education will
improve the child's performance. The result is that high-performing gifted
children are found in need of special education despite out-performing their non-
disabled peers.
Frameworks and the curriculum of the district.
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 603, § 28.02 (2003).
251. COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-20-103(1.5) (2000).
252. TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0520-1-9-.01(20) (2003).
253. A state's minimum performance goals are an inappropriate standard to
determine need. See infra notes 320-23 and accompanying text.
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For example, in Benjamin R. the hearing officer found "a gifted child with
very superior cognitive abilities" who performed well academically and socially
in kindergarten still needed special education." 4 A need was found because the
child's "language and cognition skills surpass his performance skills" and
"perceptual deficits exist which impact on educational progress." ' Likewise,
in Conrad Weiser Area School District v. Department of Education, the school
district denied a mentally gifted child eligibility as learning disabled because of
his success in regular education.256 The court stated that a child needs special
education when his performance level "'is not sufficient to demonstrate success
in the regular classroom." 257 Despite the performance-based test it enunciated,
and despite the child's classroom success, the court held that the child needed
special education because he "had problems with the rate and degree of
completion of his written work." ' Similarly, in West Chester Area School
District v. Bruce C., the school district refused to find a child with ADD eligible
because he performed average to above average academically, though he
dropped from Level I to Level III courses. 59 The court disagreed, holding that
"a student's entitlement to IDEA services 'must be gauged in relation to the
child's potential' and therefore the appeals panel "erred in focusing on Chad's
grades while disregarding Chad's potential.2 60
A more awkward analysis, with the same result, was employed in Natchez-
Adams School Disrict v. Searing ex rel. Searing, where a child with cerebral
palsy "made good academic progress" and "was making progress in the gross
and fine motor skills area" without special education. 6' The court cited the need
requirement but concluded that "[b]y suggesting that it has no obligation to
provide occupational therapy for Evan unless the Searings first demonstrate that
this service is required, Natchez-Adams confuses the standard [for eligibility]"
with the free appropriate public education standard.262 These decision-makers
essentially hold that because a child can benefit from special education, it is
needed.
254. Benjamin R., 508 EHLR 183, 185 (Mass. SEA 1986).
255. Id.
256. Conrad Weiser Area Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 603 A.2d 701, 702 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992).
257. Id. at 704 (quoting 22 PA. CODE § 342.25(a)(2)).
258. Id. at 705.
259. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Bruce C., 194 F. Supp. 2d 417, 418 (E.D. Pa.
2002); W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 235, 237 (Pa. SEA 2001).
260. Bruce C., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (quoting Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna
Intermediate Unit 16, 835 F.2d 171, 185 (3d Cir. 1988)).
261. Natchez-Adams Sch. Dist. v. Searing ex rel. Searing, 918 F. Supp. 1028,
1037-38 (S.D. Miss. 1996).
262. Id. at 1038.
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Even OSEP arguably employs this benefit standard. When asked whether
a child advancing from grade to grade may need special education, OSEP
responded that if a "student's educational performance would be adversely
affected in the absence of [special education]," then the child needs special
education.263 In other words, if special education can help, it is needed. But this
contradicts OSEP's earlier position when it analyzed the eligibility of three
categories of learning disabled children: those performing "above,"
"comparably" to and "below" the level of their age peers. 2" It found that the
average performers were not IDEA eligible because:
In the case where a student's disability does not interfere with the
student's ability to benefit from participation in the regular education
program without supplementary aid and services, and the student is
progressing from grade to grade at the same rate as his or her age
peers, then that student is not entitled under the Act to special
education.26
While later policy statements superseded certain portions of this position, the
need analysis taking into account the child's current educational performance
was not altered.266 The department in charge of interpreting IDEA, therefore,
provides conflicting guidance on the issue.
The benefit standard employed by the above decision-makers and arguably
OSEP is not mandated by IDEA and is likely not mandated by general state
educational standards. IDEA expressly provides that the child must need special
education, not merely that the child could benefit from it.267 Congress clearly
263. Letter to Pawlisch, 24 IDELR 959, 966 (OSEP 1996); see also Letter to
Lillie/Felton, 23 IDELR 714, 718 (OSEP 1995) (when asked if learning disabled students
that receive good grades can be IDEA eligible, OSEP set forth the need requirement and
the "adversely affects" requirement and entitled them the "common denominator").
264. Letter to Hartman, 213 EHLR 252, 254 (OSEP 1989).
265. Id. (citations omitted). The above average performers were found ineligible
based on their failure to fulfill the LD classification requirements and not on the need
requirement. The below average performers were found eligible, without any need
analysis, simply because they fit the definition of LD. Id.
266. Letter to Lillie/Felton, 23 IDELR at 720 (finding that portions of the Hartman
position were superseded by Letter to Ulissi, 18 IDELR 683 (OSEP 1992)). The
Hartman letter found that classification as LD was inappropriate if the child was
achieving commensurate with age peers or the child's own potential ability. The Ulissi
letter superseded only this portion of the Hartman letter, finding that the discrepancy
must be in ability versus performance and that comparison to same age peers was
inappropriate to find a qualifying LD discrepancy. Letter to Ulissi, 18 IDELR at 687.
The Ulissi letter never discussed the "need" eligibility requirement but focused
exclusively on the regulations defining LD. Id.
267. 20 U.S.C § 1401(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii) (2000).
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intended the term "need" to limit the class of eligible children.2 68 It does not
simply introduce the special education limitation, but rather is itself a restriction
on eligibility. Applying the benefit standard reads the need limitation out of
IDEA. The Supreme Court is particularly wary of such judicial lawmaking
under IDEA and would almost certainly interpret "need" according to its plain
meaning.
269
Contrasting the "need" term to "adversely affects" refines its limiting
connotation. The plain meaning of adverse effect is any effect no matter the
child's current performance level. The plain meaning of "need," on the other
hand, signifies a necessity, exigency, or a lack of something essential.
Ascertaining a child's need for services, therefore, unavoidably involves
knowing the child's current level of educational performance. After all, the key
factor distinguishing what one wants from what one needs is what one already
has. The benefit standard does not consider what the child already has or can do;
instead any benefit from special education suffices. Accordingly, unless state
standards employ a benefit standard, one cannot be read into IDEA.
If the plain meaning of "need" does not end the matter, other provisions of
IDEA do. The IEP must include "a statement of the child's present levels of
educational performance. 27' The goals of the IEP and the special education and
related services provided to the child hinge on these performance levels.2 2
Because performance level determines the level of services the child needs to
reach the IEP goals, it should also determine if services are needed at all for
eligibility purposes.
On the other hand, another IDEA provision requires states to identify, locate
and evaluate all children with disabilities residing in the state "regardless of the
severity of their disabilities. '273 This language arguably supports the position
that eligibility should be determined without reference to the child's current
educational performance, i.e. how severely the disability impacts the child. Yet
courts hold that this language actually defeats a derivative of the benefit
268. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch. Sys., 27 IDELR 756 (Tenn. SEA 1997) ("It was
clearly the intent of the legislature to restrict the provision of special education services
to those students with significant need."); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at
30 (IDEA seeks to protect high need children); McClendon, supra note 16, at 92
("Congress intended that only a certain class of children, those truly in need, were to
receive the protection and benefits of the IDEA.").
269. See supra note 211.
270. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1054 (7th ed. 1999) ("1. The lack of something
important; a requirement. 2. Indigence."); Meriam Webster's Online Dictionary,
available at http://www.m-w.com ("to be needful or necessary").
271. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(1) (2003).
272. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(2)-(3)
(2003).
273. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2000).
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standard-that a severely disabled child must be able to benefit from special
education before eligibility attaches. 4 The First Circuit rejected this proposition
because "[tihe language of the Act is directly to the contrary: a school district
has a duty to provide an educational program for every handicapped child in the
district, regardless of the severity of the handicap. 2 7 If an ability to benefit
from special education is unnecessary to find a need for it, the mere fact that a
child can benefit from special education should also not establish a need for it. 7 6
Indeed, most decision-makers implicitly reject the benefit standard and
instead consider the child's current performance level when ascertaining whether
a need for special education exists. 7 It was expressly rejected in Avon Public
Schools, where the hearing officer noted that the child "could benefit" from
special education but did not need special education because she
has been passing from grade to grade achieving A's and B's in all
subjects, demonstrating objective progress through nearly yearly
standardized tests scores consistent with her age and grade level,
participating without difficulty in all classroom assignments and
activities; in sum acquiring skills and knowledge in a speed and
manner and consistent with her regular education peers.
7 1
Unless a state standard provides that a need for special education exists if the
child can benefit from it, a child should only be found in need of special
education when his or her educational performance falls below a certain level.
274. Timothy W. ex rel. Cynthia W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954,
962 (1 st Cir. 1989). Whether the child could benefit from (i.e. needed) special education
was a hotly contested factual dispute with the trial court and First Circuit reaching
opposite conclusions. The First Circuit did not engage in any discussion of what "needs
special education" meant in the statute or how such a requirement may relate to the
"benefit" eligibility standard the court rejected. Id.; see also Quintana ex rel. Padilla v.
Dep't of Educ., 30 IDELR 503, 506 (P.R. Cir. Ct. App. 1998) ("no evidence need to be
shown that the child will benefit from the [special education] as a requisite to compel the
government to provide such education"). But see Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397,
1405 (7th Cir. 1985) (hypothesizing that "if the child is so far handicapped as to be
unconscious, and is thus wholly uneducable, he falls outside the protection of the Act
even though his handicap is more rather than less severe than that of the children
protected by the Act").
275. Timothy W., 875 F.2d at 962.
276. The "regardless of severity" language also does not impel a finding that
current performance levels are irrelevant to eligibility because it exists in the "child find"
provisions, not the eligibility criteria. That a state must find and evaluate all children
with disabilities regardless of severity does not require that the state classify these
children as eligible regardless of the severity of their disabilities.
277. See cases cited infra Part IV.B.2.
278. Avon Pub. Schs., 25 IDELR 778, 784 (Mass. SEA 1997).
57
Garda: Garda: Untangling Eligibility Requirements under the Individuals
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
The critical question becomes what level of performance results in a need for
special education.
2. The Performance Standard
Before determining what level of performance-failing, below average,
average, above average, or excellent-equates to a need for special education,
decision-makers must know how to ascertain a child's current level of
educational performance. This requires answering two questions. First, which
of the child's performance areas must need special education? Second, is
performance level determined with or without the non-special education services
the child may already be receiving?
As to the first issue, decision-makers often find that because a child
performs well academically the child does not need special education, even
though another area of the child's educational performance may require special
education. They do not deny eligibility on the grounds that "educational
performance" is limited to academics, but instead because a child needs special
education only to address academic performance. The issue typically arises
when the child's out-of-school behavior reduces or prevents school attendance
yet the child achieves good grades. In Katherine S. v. Umbach the child's
significant emotional and behavioral problems led the parents to home-school
her and later place her at a residential facility.279 The court found the child did
not need special education because she "was able to make academic progress and
to graduate successfully" from the residential placement.28 Similarly, in
Ludington School District the child achieved As and Bs despite acute behavior
problems resulting in several suspensions from school.28" ' The hearing officer
concluded that the child did not need special education because the child,
"despite his behavior problems, is able to profit from regular education and
therefore is not eligible for special education programs and services.""28
These decisions are incorrect because a need for special education can exist
in any area of educational performance adversely affected by the disability, not
just academics. Recall that a child must by reason of the disability that adversely
279. Katherine S. v. Umbach, No. CIV.A. 00-T-982-E, 2002 WL 226697, at *2-5
(M.D. Ala. Feb. 1, 2002).
280. Id. at * 11. The child received Cs and above in the residential setting, id. at
*3, and was a leader and role model. Id. at *6.
281. Ludington Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 137, 138-39 (Mich. SEA 2001). The child
was "unwilling to follow school directives, and... adamant in his refusal to do the work
assigned .... [The child] has left school without authorization, and has physically
attacked adults and students in the school setting without any observable remorse....
This behavior has resulted in numerous suspensions." Id. at 138.
282. Id. at 140.
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affects educational performance need special education.283 Accordingly, a child
is IDEA eligible if the child needs special education by reason of, or on account
of, an enumerated disability that adversely affects educational performance. As
explained above, attendance and behavior are educational performance that must
be addressed despite good academic performance. They are not merely means
to the end of academic achievement, but are themselves educational ends. 8'
They were treated as such in Monrovia Unified School District, where a child
that performed well academically was still found in need of special education
because the student's behavioral problems led to removals from class and
multiple school suspensions.285 The hearing officer properly recognized that
behavior and attendance are educational performance that may need addressing
through special education. This does not mean that the results of Umbach and
Ludington are incorrect, as the children may have needed something other than
special education to solve their attendance problems.2 8 But the analysis the
courts employed was incorrect because they precluded a finding of need based
solely on academic performance.
As to the second issue, decision-makers agree that the child's educational
performance should be ascertained taking into account the non-special education
services the child receives under Section 504.287 In other words, children are not
283. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(a)(ii), (b)(ii) (2000).
284. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
285. Monrovia Unified Sch. Dist., 38 IDELR 84, 87-88 (Cal. SEA 2002).
286. The court in Umbach also stated that "it is key that none of the evidence,
especially including reports and testimony from the experts who evaluated Katherine,
supports a finding that her emotional difficulties caused her to be... in need of special
education or related services." Katherine S. v. Umbach, No. CIV.A. 00-T-982-E, 2002
WL 226697, at *12 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 1, 2002).
287. See, e.g., Acad. Sch. Dist. #20,21 IDELR 965 (Colo. SEA 1994) (concluding
child did not need special education based on child's performance, taking into account
behavior management strategies); Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 EHLR 335, 337 (Ohio
SEA 1989) ("In this case the evidence is clear that without substantial tutoring and
parental help he received, he would not have passed to the next grade, for the second
time. So for this child, special education is required for him to benefit from his
education."); Old Orchard Beach Sch. Dep't, 21 IDELR 1084, 1090 (Me. SEA 1994)
("Special education and related services are only for those children who need assistance
in order to benefit from their education. AG is now in a personalized program with a low
teacher/student ratio, lots of accountability, a case manager to communicate with home
on a regular basis and deal with social skills issues, and taking one course at the high
school by her choice. If she were labelled, nothing would change as this program is the
one described bythe psychologists to meet her needs and the program serves both special
education and regular education students."); In re Laura H., 509 EHLR 242, 245 (Mass.
SEA 1988) (child not eligible because "[t]here is no current indication that she cannot
continue to make effective educational progress in the regular education program,
particularly with the modifications (including continued regular education guidance
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IDEA eligible if their needs are adequately addressed through non-special
education services.288 So while non-special education services were ignored in
determining the existence of a qualifying disability, they must be accounted for
in determining if a need exists. Some states go further, finding children
ineligible until non-special education interventions are shown to fail. 2 9 The
reauthorized IDEA takes steps in this direction, as the House version allows local
educational agencies to use up to fifteen percent of their funds for prereferral
services) offered by Wellesley"); Ludington Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 137, 140 (Mich. SEA
2001) (child not eligible because his "needs can be met in the regular education setting
with some modifications, and cooperation and consistency from his parent"); Arlington
Cent. Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 205, 213 (N.Y. SEA 2001) (examined child's performance
with non-special education services to determine if the child needed special education);
Corvallis Sch. Dist. 509J, 28 IDELR 1026, 1038 (Or. SEA 1998) ("Thus, when related
services and accommodations allow a student to make progress in the regular education
program, as indicated by grades or performance on academic achievement test, there is
no need for special education and therefore no eligibility under the IDEA."); In re W.
Chester Area Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 235, 239 (Pa. SEA 2001) (child ineligible because
child performed well with supports); George W. Indep. Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 287, 293
(Tex. SEA 2001) ("Instead, the evidence showed that she is successful in the regular
mainstream classroom with the assistance of the amplification device already being
provided to her by the school district. She has been and will continue to be served under
the school district's 504 program.... There is no educational need for special education
and related services under these circumstances."); In re K.M., 29 IDELR 1027, 1035 (Vt.
SEA 1999) ("[T]he student does not require a special program of instruction in order to
obtain an appropriate education despite her handicaps. She has succeeded in a regular
program of instruction, but she needs considerable accommodations to her handicap in
order to do so. As was pointed out by several witnesses, including the parent's own
consultant, this is a distinction between 504 and special education eligibility that is often
confused or misunderstood.").
288. 34 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A, at 106 (2003) ("Because many students receiving
services under IDEA will also receive services under the Rehabilitation Act, it is
important, in planning for their future, to consider the impact of both statutes."); Letter
to Lillie/Felton, 23 IDELR 714, 719 (OSEP 1994) ("Generally, it would be appropriate
for the evaluation team to consider information about outside or extra learning support
provided to the child ... as such information may indicate that the child's current
educational achievement reflects the service augmentation, not what the child's
achievement would be without such help.").
289. California expressly defines an eligible "individual with exceptional needs"
as a student with an impairment that "requires instruction, services, or both, which cannot
be provided with modification of the regular school program." CAL. EDUC. CODE §
56026(b) (West 2003); see also id. § 56337(c) (learning disability requires a severe
discrepancy between ability and that "discrepancy cannot be corrected through other
regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program"); Norton
v. Orinda Union Sch. Dist., No. CV-95-02808-SBA, 1999 WL 97288, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb.
25, 1999) ("IDEA protection is available in California only where modifications to the
student's regular educational program are ineffective.").
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services for students before they are identified as needing special education.29
It is wise policy to employ non-special education services before finding that a
child needs special education, otherwise "many children who are placed into
special education are essentially instructional casualties and not students with
disabilities."29' Accordingly, the child's level of educational performance must
take into account the non-special education services the child receives.
With knowledge of how to ascertain a child's current level of educational
performance, the question of what level the child's performance must fall below
before a need exists can be examined.
a. The Problem
Decision-makers disagree as to where the child's educational performance
must fall along the continuum of performance to be considered eligible. Some
set the eligibility bar high, requiring failure before a need will be found. Some
set it low, finding that a mere inability to reach one's potential establishes a need.
It is easier to determine where along this continuum the need bar should rest
once the common ground is traversed.
There is agreement that a failing child needs special education.292 There is
also agreement, at least for the decision-makers who properly take current
educational performance into consideration, that when a child's educational
performance is above average there is no need for special education. In Grant
v. St. James Parish School Board, a dyslexic child made the honor roll in junior
and senior high school with numerous non-special education services.293 The
Fifth Circuit agreed that the school did not have to evaluate the student for IDEA
eligibility because he "'was performing ... on average or above average...'
even before the accommodations." '294 Similarly, in Weston Public School
290. H.R. 1350,108th Cong. § 203(f) (2003); H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 108 (2003)
("The eligibility for special education services would focus on the children who, even
with these services, are not able to be successful.").
291. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 26.
292. See, e.g., Muller ex rel. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ., 145 F.3d 95, 98
(2d Cir. 1998); see cases cited infra notes 311-15 (requiring that the child fail in order
to need special education).
293. Grant v. St. James Parish Sch. Bd., No. CIV.A. 99-3757, 2000 WL 1693632,
at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2000), af'd, 273 F.3d 1102 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished table
opinion).
294. Id. at *5; see also Eric H. ex rel. Gary H. v. Judson Indep. Sch. Dist., No.
CIV.A. SA01CA0804-NN, 2002 WL 31396140, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 30,2002) (while
the court focused more on propriety of evaluation procedures than the "need" analysis,
it concluded that child receiving As and Bs in honors courses could not "demonstrate a
present need for special education services and related services because of the
disability").
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District, the hearing officer found the third grade child did not need special
education because he was "performing above grade level expectations in math
and spelling, between the third and fourth grade levels in reading and at the third
grade level in writing without any modifications to the curriculum or any
specialized instruction." '29 The vast majority of hearing officers and courts find
that above average educational performance means special education is not
needed.2
9 6
295. Weston Pub. Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 75, 83 (Mass. SEA 2001).
296. See, e.g., St. Clair County Bd. of Educ., 29 IDELR 688 (Ala. SEA 1998)
(child receiving As and Bs and active in extracurricular activities did not require special
education); Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR 113, 119 (Cal. SEA 2000)
("Notwithstanding STUDENT's need for classroom modifications, he has managed to
maintain the grades necessary to remain enrolled in an accelerated program. This leads
the Hearing Officer to the conclusion that STUDENT's needs can be met through
services available in the general education classroom."); Ludington Sch. L.A. Unified
Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR 71, 82 (Cal. SEA 1999) (hearing officer denied IDEA eligibility
to a gifted student with an anxiety disorder because "STUDENT, who is eight years old,
has achieved above-average grades in college classes at Santa Monica College"); In re
Hollister Sch. Dist., 26 IDELR 632, 664 (Cal. SEA 1997) ("based on STUDENT'S
ability to receive commendable grades in the absence of special education services, ...
the ability to show progress on measures of academic achievement, and to pass
successfully from grade to grade ... STUDENT did not require [special education]");
Santa Ana Unif. Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 1189 (Cal. SEA 1994) (child with B average and
performing "above grade level in most academic areas" did not need special education
to address disability); Weymouth Pub. Sch., 21 IDELR 578, 588 (Mass. SEA 1994) (the
child did not need special education because the child was "progressing effectively in
regular education" as shown by his average and above average grades); Springfield Pub.
Sch., 17 EHLR 264, 268 (Mass. SEA 1990) (child "performing above grade level" and
who "earns very high grades" did not need special education); Dist., 35 IDELR 137, 140
(Mich. SEA 2001) (while the hearing officer improperly excluded consideration of non-
academic performance, the hearing found that receiving As and Bs and scoring above
average on standardized tests meant the child did not need special education); Smithtown
Cent. Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR 46, 50 (N.Y. SEA 1999) (child with hearing deficits and
ADD performed above average in school with non-special education services and
therefore did not need special education.); Bd. of Educ., 29 IDELR 122, 128 (N.Y. SEA
1998) (autistic child that "succeeded in a regular education class" was properly
declassified because "the record does not demonstrate that he can only receive
appropriate educational opportunities from a program of special education"); Corvallis
Sch. Dist. 509J, 28 IDELR 1026, 1038 (Or. SEA 1998) (because the child "was found
to have achievement levels at or above grade level in all areas and considerably above
grade level in several" she did not need special education); Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 37
IDELR 267, 270-71 (Pa. SEA 2002) (child who received "satisfactory" and "quite
positive" grades did not need special education); Conrad Weiser Area Sch. Dist., 27
IDELR 100, 103 (Pa. SEA 1997) (gifted child with ADD and learning disability in
written expression did not need special education because "[a]ssessments, standardized
tests, and teacher testimony show that organizational weaknesses have not deterred his
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Most courts and hearing officers also agree that a child whose educational
performance is average does not surpass the need hurdle. For example, in
Huntsville City Public School the district declassified a child as learning disabled
because she no longer needed special education.297 The hearing officer agreed
because the child "successfully completed the eleventh grade" as "an average
student" that was "very active in outside activities. "298 Similarly, in Northshore
School District, a child with ADHD performing in the average range in
kindergarten was denied eligibility because "the educational challenges the
Student does have are not sufficiently affecting her educational performance
such as to keep her from staying within the range of her [ ] peers such that she
needs specially designed instruction. 299  In In re Pasos Robles Union
Elementary School District, the child was not IDEA eligible despite "having
difficulties in school" and receiving Cs, because his performance was
"insufficient to support a finding that [he] currently requires special education
and resulted services to succeed in the regular classroom.""3 '
above grade level functioning, making special education instruction unwarranted");
Wayne Highlands Sch. Dist., 24 IDELR 476, 478 (Pa. SEA 1996) (child with Chronic
Fatigue Syndrome that received "good grades" does not need special education); George
W. Indep. Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 287, 290 (Tex. SEA 2001) ("the evidence showed that
she is successful in the regular mainstream classroom [receiving high grades] with the
assistance of the amplification device already being provided to her by the school district.
... There is no educational need for special education and related services under these
circumstances.") (citations omitted); Aransas County Indep. Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 141,
144-45 (Tex. SEA 1998) (child with ADD and a learning disability was denied eligibility
because he performed at or above grade level in all subjects"); In re K.M., 29 IDELR
1027, 1036 (Vt. SEA 1999) (Child receiving As and Bs in residential setting without
special education "does not require a special program of instruction in order to obtain an
appropriate education despite her handicaps. She has succeeded in a regular program of
instruction .. ").
297. Huntsville City Pub. Sch., 21 IDELR 970 (Ala. SEA 1994).
298. Id. at 971.
299. Northshore Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 144, 149 (Wash. SEA 2001).
300. In re Pasos Robles Union Elementary Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 1197, 1194 (Cal.
SEA 1994); see also Greenfield Pub. Sch., 21 IDELR 345, 349 (Mass. SEA 1994)
(applying Massachussets definition of need, the hearing officer found the student
ineligible as learning disabled because he "is a student capable of doing average level
work at his appropriate grade level, and.. . he has in fact been doing this during at least
his second and third grade years"); In re Laura H., 509 EHLR 242, 245 (Mass. SEA
1988) (child with environmental illness that prevented her from attending chemistry lab
did not "need" special education of a closed circuit television for chemistry lab under
Section 504 because her average performance established that she "is capable of learning
'satisfactorily' with the supplementary aids and services available to her [an alternative
biology class] within the regular education program"); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 35
IDELR 205, 213 (N.Y. SEA 2001) (child with discrepancy between verbal and
performance IQ scores did not need special education because the "student's performance
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OSEP apparently supports the position that a child performing average in
regular education does not need special education.30 ' OSEP had a chance to
clarify itself when it was asked whether it was appropriate to deny learning
disabled children eligibility "because they are receiving As, Bs and Cs on their
report cards and are passing from grade to grade at the same rate as their
peers." ' 2 OSEP ducked the question, however, and merely cited the regulations
defining LD without ever reaching the "need" question posed.3"'
While there is general agreement among decision-makers that failing
children need special education and children performing average to above
average do not, there is sharp disagreement when the child performs poorly yet
passes from grade to grade. Some states legislate that children must fail in the
regular classroom before finding a need for special education.3"4 Many courts
and hearing officers, even without such an express state standard, require a child
to fail in regular education before a need for special education exists. For
in school [satisfactory or above] was generally commensurate with the results of his
cognitive testing"); Rochester City Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR 178, 185 (N.Y. SEA 1999)
("Though his IQ scores place him in the superior range of intellectual functioning, and
his academic performance is in the average range, it is not clear that the child requires
special education services.... Based upon the record before me, I am unable to find that
the child's medical condition adversely impacted his academic performance to the extent
that he required special education and/or related services."); Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 26
IDELR 1208, 1212 (Pa. SEA 1997) (child with vision problem whose academic
functioning was commensurate with his age was "neither an eligible student as a disabled
child for Chapter 14/IDEA special education nor is he in need of visual therapy as a
related service to his gifted education program because the Record does not support a
conclusion that his optometrist-identified visual problem requires specialized instruction
for Michael to benefit from either his regular or gifted education program").
Hearing officers also find that a school does not violate its "child find" obligation,
see supra note 23, when it fails to assess children performing in the average range for
disabilities. See, e.g., Craven County Bd. of Educ., 27 IDELR 235,250 (N.C. SEA 1997)
(district did not fail to timely identify child as disabled because child's average school
performance meant that "there were no indications that [the child] was in need of special
education"); Ashland Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 630,639 (Or. SEA 1998) (district did not fail
to timely identify child as disabled in ninth grade because of his "significant success in
classroom behavior and academically," but once child had "academic failure" in tenth
grade, the "[d]istrict should have suspected a disability and a potential need for special
education and related services").
301. Letter to Hartman, 213 EHLR 252,254 (OSEP 1989); see supra notes 264-66
and accompanying text (fully discussing the Letter to Hartman).
302. Letter to Lillie/Felton, 23 IDELR 714, 716 (OSEP 1994).
303. Id. at 721.
304. See, e.g., Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch. Sys., 27 IDELR 756, 766 (Tenn. SEA
1997) (noting that Tennessee defines "eligible child" as a child that is "unable... to be
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example, in Kelby v. Morgan Hill Unified School District a child with "poor
grades, behavior problems and inconsistent work habits" sought IDEA eligibility
as learning disabled.05 The Ninth Circuit denied eligibility because the child's
"learning difficulties are not so severe that he cannot benefit adequately from the
regular educational program."306 It applied similar reasoning in denying
eligibility to a child with ADD who tested high on "numerous psychological and
achievement tests" but performed only "adequately in the regular classroom"
even with modification of the regular school program. 0 7 It held that the child
did not require special education because his adequate30. performance
established that he was "benefitting from his regular classroom environment."3 9
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, requires less than "adequate" performance or "poor
grades" before it will find that a child needs special education.
The Ninth Circuit is not the only court to set the eligibility bar high. In
Katherine S. v. Umbach, an Alabama federal district court applied the stringent
standard that a child does not need special education unless the child
demonstrates "an inability to learn in the public school context. '3 10 The child's
above average performance established her ability to learn, but the standard
employed apparently requires failure before eligibility will attach.
Many hearing officers also require failure in regular education before
finding a need for special education. In Academy School District #20, for
example, the hearing officer denied eligibility applying Colorado's requirement
that a child only needs special education if the child is not "receiving reasonable
benefit from regular education."3' The hearing officer found that a child with
"unremarkable grades [and] a substantial number of truancies, tardies, and
disciplinary notices' ' m  was receiving "reasonable benefit from regular
305. Kelby v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 240, 241 (9th Cir. 1992)
(unpublished table opinion), available at 1992 WL 67857, at *1.
306. Id. at *3.
307. Norton v. Orinda Union Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished
table opinion), available at 1999 WL 97288, at *I. "[T]he school district modified
Allan's regular education program to include preferential seating near the front of the
classroom, use of word processor, handwriting assistance, and other assistance." Id.
308. The court did not elaborate on the child's adequate performance by providing
grades or report cards but from the discussion it appears that the child was merely
passing.
309. Norton, 1999 WL 97288, at *2. It concluded that there was no error "in
holding that Allan received an appropriate public education in the school district's
regular education program ... and that he was ineligible for IDEA protection at that
time." Id. at *3.
310. Katherine S. v. Umbach, No. CIV. A. 00-T-982-E, 2002 WL 226697, at *13
(M.D. Ala. Feb. 1, 2002).
311. Academy Sch. Dist. #20, 21 IDELR 965, 970 (Colo. SEA 1994).
312. Id. at 969.
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education" and therefore did not need special education.3"' InBellflower Unified
School District, the hearing officer similarly held that a student earning merely
passing grades in first through third grade did not need special education because
his "academic progress indicates that, at this point, he remains able to learn and
to remediate his severe discrepancy within the regular education system." ' 4
Also, in Berkeley Unified School District, the hearing officer held that a child
with poor school attendance who received Cs, Ds and Fs in seventh grade and
two Fs in eighth grade was not eligible because "modifications in the regular
school program are feasible and have a good chance of ameliorating her
difficulties. ' '35 However, these modifications were already attempted and the
child still received poor grades.
On the other hand, numerous decision-makers find that children passing yet
performing poorly need special education. For example, in Blazejewski ex rel.
Blazejewski v. Board ofEducation ofAllegany Central SchoolDistrict, the court
found the child was eligible despite passing from grade to grade because "he is
achieving rather low marks in certain basic courses [and] ... he lacks many of
the basic survival skills needed to function in the outside world."3 6 InPetaluma
313. Id. at 973.
314. Bellflower Unified Sch. Dist., 33 IDELR 262, 271 (Cal. SEA 2000); see also
Los Alamitos Unified Sch. Dist., 26 IDELR 1053, 1059-60 (Cal. SEA 1997) (third grader
reading at first grade level did not need special education because use of regular
education supports led to improvement); Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 EHLR 335, 337
(Ohio SEA 1989) ("The child should sufficiently benefit from his education so as to be
able to pass from grade to grade. In this case the evidence is clear that without
substantial tutoring and parental help he received, he would not have passed to the next
grade, for the second time. So for this child, special education is required for him to
benefit from his education."); Bristol Township Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 330,336 (Pa. SEA
1998) (child needed special education because she "still will not be able to benefit from
regular classroom instruction without specially designed instructional modifications and
adaptations and related services"). But see Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Robert M.,168 F.
Supp. 2d 635, 639 (W.D. Tex. 2001) (Hearing officer held that a child failing from a
magnet program "did not and does not need special education.... It would be a rare case
indeed where a student who affirmatively chose to attend a magnet school for gifted
students would be eligible for special education."); Portland Pub. Schs., 25 IDELR 1247
(Me. SEA 1997) (Hearing officer held that child failing majority of classes was not
behaviorally impaired and also held, with no discussion, that child did not require special
education. In short, a child, even though failing, did not "need" special education.).
315. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 507 EHLR 435, 438 (Cal. SEA 1986).
316. Blazejewski ex rel. Blazejewski v. Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 701, 705
(W.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 35 IDELR 135, 138, 141
(Md. SEA 2001) (child with ADD needed special education because despite passing he
made "minimal educational progress" in a regular classroom); Phila. Sch. Dist., 27
IDELR 447 (Pa. SEA 1997) (without discussing the "need" requirement, the hearing




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/3
2004] INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATIONACT 507
Joint Unified School District, the school district found the child ineligible,
despite the child's grades declining yearly until eighth grade when he received
all Cs, Ds and Fs, because the child progressed from grade to grade without
special education.3 7 The hearing officer disagreed, finding that the child needed
special education because "despite attempts at modification of the regular
instructional program, student continued to perform poorly" and failed two
subjects." 8 If the state standards are silent, the issue becomes whether children
merely performing poorly need special education or whether only children failing
need special education.
b. The Solution
The facial solution to this disagreement is to defer to state standards as was
done for the meaning of "educational performance." The problem is that in
states that do not specifically define "need" there are no general state educational
standards that inform decision-makers as to when special education is needed.
There is also no available fallback onto federal standards because the express
meaning of "need" only dictates against the benefit standard but does not inform
decision-makers as to what level of performance indicates a need for special
education. Accordingly, states are free to define need without running the risk
of excluding children that are otherwise eligible under IDEA. The issue,
therefore, is not where IDEA does mandate that the performance bar be set for
eligibility, but rather, where it should be set by decision-makers. Policy reasons
and cases defining the free appropriate public education to be provided eligible
children support finding that a child needs special education when any area of
the child's performance is poor, or falls below average.
The most apparent state standards to define when a need exists are the
states' minimum education standards. Employing the minimum education
standards is attractive because it incorporates clear state standards into the
meaning of need. Because these standards typically specify the content and
skills students are expected to know for each grade, they provide an easy
benchmark to determine need.319 However, a state's minimum educational
standards cannot define a student's need for special education because they are
minimum educational standards. Certainly children falling below the minimum
requirements need services. But even children performing barely above the
minimum standards still need services. Educators agree that children need
assistance when they are performing poorly but still passing because they deplore
317. Petaluma Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 25 IDELR 262, 265 (Cal. SEA 1996).
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3301.079(A)(1) (2003) ("The standards
shall specify the academic content and skills that students are expected to know and be
able to do at each grade level.").
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the strategy of waiting until a child fails to provide any assistance.32 ° Indeed,
educators intend and expect that students not only meet the minimum state
standards, but also exceed them.32' Therefore, educators find that a child needs
assistance even when passing from grade to grade and seek to be proactive with
interventions before failure occurs.3 2 2 This is particularly true for children with
disabilities, as early identification of educational problems and intervention "can
prevent disabilities in many children and ameliorate their impact in those who
develop them." '323
Of course, states are free to legislate that a need exists only when the child
falls below state minimum standards, but to infer such a requirement from the
mere existence of the states' minimum education standards is inappropriate.
Without any certain state standards, sound educational policy dictates that a need
for special education be found before failure occurs.
There is also no indication in IDEA as to when a need for special education
exists. While the express meaning of need indicates that the child's current level
of educational performance should be considered, it does not help identify what
level of performance results in a need. Many courts and hearing officers that
require failure before eligibility attaches refer to the free appropriate public
education standard in Rowley. They reason that because IDEA requires only
"some educational benefit" to eligible children, any child already receiving some
educational benefit, i.e. passing from grade to grade, is ineligible. For example,
in Hoffman v. East Troy Community School District, the court held that the
school district did not have reasonable cause to believe the child needed special
education.324 Citing Rowley, the court reasoned that "[t]hough not stellar and
certainly not reflective of his full potential, Joseph's mostly passing grades at
East Troy suggest that he was still receiving 'educational benefit' from his
classes, at least as understood under IDEA."32
320. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 84, 108, 124 (2003) (waiting for failure is bad
educational policy, and educators must attempt to prevent failure); PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 7-8.
321. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-140 (2001) (Georgia establishes
"competencies that each student is expected to master" and also "competencies for which
each student should be provided opportunities.., to master.").
322. Id.; see also Callegary, supra note 25, at 197.
323. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 22-23.
324. Hoffman v. E. Troy Cmty. Sch. Dist., 38 F. Supp. 2d 750, 762 (E.D. Wis.
1999).
325. Id. at 764 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,203 (1982)); see also
Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch. Sys., 27 IDELR 756, 761 (Tenn. SEA 1997) (after citing
Rowley, the hearing officer concluded that the child was already receiving some
educational benefit from regular education and therefore did not need special education);
Fauquier County Pub. Sch., 20 IDELR 579, 584 (Va. SEA 1993) (though not citing
Rowley, the hearing officer found the child ineligible because "the law requires only
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While referencing Rowley's "some educational benefit" standard when
defining educational performance is possible because of the shared term
"educational," there is no such justification for reverse engineering Rowley's
"some educational benefit" standard into the need analysis. The facile
explanation is that Rowley did not delineate the eligibility standards of IDEA, it
explained only the free appropriate public education that must be provided
eligible children. The Eighth Circuit reasoned, when finding a child eligible
despite the child's good school performance, that "[t]he issue here is not whether
current IDEA services are adequate [as it was in Rowley], but whether Tracy
remains entitled to receive any benefits under IDEA." '326 OSEP employs the
same analysis.327 The First Circuit summarized the position eloquently: "The
Court's use of 'benefit' in Rowley was a substantive limitation placed on the
state's choice of an educational program; it was not a license for the state to
exclude certain handicapped children." '328
However, the fact that Rowley dealt exclusively with services to eligible
children does not render it entirely useless in eligibility questions. As explained
enough attention to the emotional problems to insure that the Child will receive some
educational benefit").
326. Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369, 1375 (8th Cir. 1996); see also
Natchez-Adams Sch. Dist. v. Searing ex rel. Searing, 918 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (S.D.
Miss. 1996) (rejecting the argument that a child passing from grade to grade does not
need special education because it "confuses the standard to be applied in determining
access to educational benefits with that required in designing the content of an IEP" as
was done in Rowley).
327. Letter to Pawlisch, 24 IDELR 959, 963 (OSEP 1995). While OSEP held that
a child passing from grade to grade might be eligible, it failed to identify the
circumstances under which eligibility arises. In the first example of an eligible learning
disabled child passing from grade to grade, OSEP found that such a child may be passing
only because he receives some type of services augmentation or "special education"
outside of the classroom and therefore may still need special education despite passing
grades. Id. at 965. In addressing the example provided by the inquirer-a child with a
physical impairment that does not require modification to the regular educational
program to perform well academically-OSEP instead chose to question whether the
"modifications" were in fact "special education" and therefore the child needed special
education. Id. at 966. By assuming that the child needed special education to pass from
grade to grade in both examples, OSEP ducked the critical question of whether a child
passing from grade to grade without special education may still need special education.
Finally, OSEP cited two cases where it was determined that "a student placed in the
regular educational environment and making progress in that environment still needs
special education or related services." Id. However, the issue in the cited cases was not
whether the child "needed" services, that issue was stipulated, but rather whether such
services were in fact "special education." See discussion of Yankton supra notes 190-93,
222-25 and accompanying text.
328. Timothy W. ex rel. Cynthia W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954,
971 (1st Cir. 1989).
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above, the Court's use of "educational benefit" to define a free appropriate
public education gave clues to the meaning of educational performance for
eligibility.a2 9 However, requiring districts to provide "some educational benefit"
to eligible students yields no similar clues as to when a "need" for special
education exists.
The first reason is that the Rowley Court relied on the express language of
the statute to find a minimum benefit standard for eligible children. Because
IDEA's definition of "related services" expressed that the child must "benefit"
from special education, the Court reasoned that IDEA requires benefit to eligible
children.3 3 ° Without similar benefit language in the eligibility standards, the
"some benefit" standard cannot be grafted onto the need requirement and
children receiving "some benefit" from regular education may be eligible.
Furthermore, the Court in Rowley limited this to merely "some benefit"
because the purpose of IDEA was to "make public education available" and to
"open the door of public education to handicapped children [on appropriate
terms rather] than to guarantee any particular substantive level of education once
inside."3 '' With equal access and not equal opportunity as the goal of IDEA, a
low "some benefit" standard for eligible children was justified.332 In contrast, the
purpose of equal access is obstructed, if not totally subverted, by requiring that
children fail in regular education before eligibility attaches. While the "some
benefit" standard for the services required by IDEA was justified by the purpose
of equal access, the same purpose counsels against finding that children
receiving some benefit from regular education are ineligible.333 Indeed, the low
level of services required by IDEA for eligible children justifies pushing the
eligibility door open. If schools were required to maximize eligible children's
potential, cost alone would warrant leaving the eligibility door only ajar.
Finally, the Court in Rowley expressly identified a class of eligible children
that was passing from grade to grade yet was not being appropriately served.
This implies a class of children who are eligible because they are not performing
as well as Amy Rowley, who received As and Bs, or because they have
educational needs not reflected in grades.334 In other words, the class of eligible
children identified in Rowley that pass from grade to grade yet still need special
education may very well be children passing from grade to grade but performing
below average, i.e. getting Ds. This reasoning was employed in West Chester
Area School District v. Bruce C., where the court, relying on Rowley, rejected
329. See supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
330. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89.
331. Id. at 177.
332. Id. at 200; see also Daniel & Coriell, supra note 20, at 582.
333. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 22 (eligibility teams should err
on side of provision of services).
334. See supra Part III.A.2.
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the "determination that Chad is ineligible for an IEP [because] his grades have
never dipped below the passing level."33 Similarly, the court in Mary P. v.
Illinois State Board of Education rejected the school district's argument that a
child passing from grade to grade does not need special education "[b]ecause the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that the sole test for an appropriate
education was advancement from grade to grade . .. [T]he court finds no
authority from Rowley to impose such a requirement on the test for eligibility in
the present case. '"336
In summary, the free appropriate public education standard applied to
eligible children supports finding that children passing yet performing poorly
need special education. This standard appropriately eliminates average and
above average performers from eligibility, an outcome that already finds virtually
unanimous support from courts and hearing officers. Children able to
compensate for their disability so that their educational performance (e.g. grades,
attendance, behavior) is average to above average should not be eligible. After
all, we are all talented and handicapped to a certain extent, and if our talents
overcome our handicaps we should not be IDEA eligible.337 The proposed
standard also includes certain children who are not failing but are performing
poorly. Including these children "opens the door of public education" and allows
districts to respond and address problems early when there is more chance of
successful treatment, rather than waiting for failure when treatment may be too
late. Several states incorporate a less precise but similar definition of need,
requiring that the child be unable to receive "reasonable benefit" '338 or "progress
effectively"339 before a need is found.
Based on the above standard, a child should be deemed to need special
education when any area of her educational performance is poor or below
335. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Bruce C., 194 F. Supp. 2d 417, 421 (E.D. Pa.
2002). While the court was correct in rejecting the "some benefit" FAPE standard as the
need standard, it improperly reasoned that a need exists and eligibility attaches whenever
the child is not meeting his potential. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
336. Mary P. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 919 F. Supp. 1173, 1180 (N.D. Ill. 1996),
amended by 934 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Ill. 1996); see also Blazejewski ex rel. Blazejewski
v. Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 701, 705 (D.C.N.Y. 1983) (court refused to employ
Rowley's "benefit" standard to eligibility determination because Rowley did not hold that
every child passing from grade to grade was receiving a free appropriate public
education).
337. Krass, supra note 28, at 1017 ("Classifying children as either handicapped or
non-handicapped is not more accurate than labeling them talented or non-talented,
because all people are both talented and handicapped to a certain extent.") (citation
omitted).
338. COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-20-103(1.5) (2000).
339. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71 B, § 1 (West 1996); MASS. GEN. REGS. CODE
tit. 603, § 28.02(9) (2003).
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average. For example, if a child's attendance is below the average of his peers,
the child should clear the need hurdle, though the child must still establish that
special education is necessary to address the attendance problem and that the
problem is caused by the disability and not other factors. The same is true for
any area of educational performance. The team of professionals charged with
determining eligibility will best be able to ascertain when a child's educational
performance is poor or below average such that special education is needed.
V. CONCLUSION
A child is eligible under IDEA if the child's enumerated disability, and not
other factors, has any effect, no matter how slight, on any area of instruction
mandated in the state curriculum or any area of performance formally tracked by
the state's schools, and the child's performance in that area is poor or below
average. With this straightforward definition in mind, the primary question
posed in the introduction is answered. A child passing from grade to grade may
still be IDEA eligible if either the child's disability adversely affects non-graded
areas of educational performance or the child's educational performance is poor
but passing.
This answer, however, is merely a byproduct of this Article's primary
attempt to ascertain the scope and reach of IDEA by untangling IDEA's web of
eligibility requirements. Unfurling the "adversely affects educational
performance" requirement established that IDEA addresses more than just
academic problems. Acknowledging the broad range of problems IDEA seeks
to address merely recognizes the broad range of skills that parents have
empowered educators to teach their children. Whether for good or ill, modem
schools are responsible for teaching much more than academics. Accordingly,
educational performance under IDEA should include all areas of instruction
identified in the state curriculum and all areas of performance tracked by the
state's schools, and not merely graded performance.
With the problems IDEA seeks to address identified, untangling the "needs
special education" requirement established how severe the problem should be
before IDEA is implicated. IDEA provides states great latitude in this regard.
With all school resources and instruction designed not only to prevent failure but
also to allow children to exceed minimum educational standards, a disability
should not have to result in failure before eligibility attaches. IDEA, therefore,
should address students' disabilities when the child's educational performance
is poor, and before failure occurs.
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